Premier Leauge: Points dropped from winning positions table and points won from losing positions table

The table below ranks Premier League teams by points gained from losing positions. In other words, if a team was losing at any point in a given match and went on to tie that match, they'd earn one point from a losing position. If they won the match they'd earn 3 points from a losing position. Liverpool and Swansea have played 27 games. The other 18 teams have played 26.

The following table ranks teams by the number of points dropped from winning positions. In other words if a team was winning at any given point in a match and went on to draw, they'd drop 2 points from that match. If they lost the match they'd obviously drop all 3 points. Note that individual matches can show up both as points won from losing positions and points dropped from winning positions. For instance, in their recent match with Manchester City, Liverpool went down to an early goal, rallied back to take a 2-1 lead, then conceded a late goal to draw 2-2. Therefore they earned 1 point from a losing position and dropped 2 points from a winning position.

Juventus 2-0 Celtic: Juve forwards exploit 2 v. 2 at the back

Juventus put in a vintage Italian performance in a 3-0 win over Celtic at Parkhead, sitting deep and organizing themselves defensively to deal with wave after wave of Celtic's frenetic attack and finishing their few forays into the attacking third with magnificent efficiency. While many an observer of this game will argue Celtic battered their Italian opposition and were unfortunate to lose in the manner they did, the Italians were prepared for this type of game and deserve loads of credit for executing their system and making it difficult for Celtic to break them down in the final third.

Celtic missed a golden chance in the first half when Ambrose, included in the starting 11 despite playing in the final of the ANC Sunday, headed straight at Buffon from 6 yards out. Aside from that, Juventus were rarely stretched at the back to the point of defending desperately- they were compact, organized and able to deal with crosses into the area.

Juventus were without Kwadwo Asamoah who was deemed unfit after playing for Ghana in the ANC third place game Saturday. He was replaced at left wing back by Federico Peluso. Vucinic and Matri partnered up front- Quagliarella, Giovinco and Anelka all had places on the bench. Elsewhere the side was as expected in their usual 3-5-2.

Neil Lennon opted for an interesting, narrow 4-3-2-1 'Christmas tree' formation. Lustig, Ambrose, Wilson and Izaguirre lined up across the back. Brown, Wanyama and Mulgrew formed a central midfield three. Mulgrew and Wanyama tended to stay deeper while Brown was given license to get into more advanced areas on the right. James Forrest and Kris Commons played narrow just in behind Gary Hooper and then would look to make runs out into the channels behind Juve's wing backs.

Neil Lennon's tinkering with his formation was a brave one but made sense given his side's intent on pressing high up the pitch. The 4-3-2-1 shape meant Juventus didn't have a spare man anywhere on the pitch when Celtic pressed and therefore made it very difficult to play out of the back. Commons and Forrest pushed on to the outside center backs Caceres and Barzagli and Hooper pressed Bonucci. Brown tracked Pirlo as he dropped in to try to collect the ball of his center backs, which left Wanyama and Mulgrew to mark Marchisio and Vidal 2 v. 2. Celtic's outside backs Lustig and Izaguirre pushed high up the pitch on to Juve's wing backs. Ambrose and Mulgrew were therefore responsible for defending Matri and Vucinic 2 v. 2 at the back.

Without a spare central defender at the back, Celtic's success was always going to depend on whether Wilson and Ambrose could win their individual battles with the Juve forwards. Against Chelsea and Shakhtar Donetsk in the group stages Juventus showed how devastating the movement of their two forwards can be against two center defenders. One forward will typically drop into midfield, forcing one of the opposition center backs to follow him into midfield and thereby opening up space for either a diagonal run from the other forward or a burst in behind from midfield by one of the shuttling midfielders Vidal or Marchisio.

With Celtic's tireless pressing denying Juve the time and space on the ball to build any patient attacks, the Italians frequently looked to play balls over the top to their forwards, confident that eventually Matri or Vucinic could win their individual battle and go through on goal. They'd have been pleasantly surprised at just how quickly the strategy came to fruition. Peluso played a simple ball over the top to Matri in the third minute. The Juve forward shrugged Ambrose aside and slotted a shot past Fraser Forster and across the goal line before it could be cleared away.

Juve's second goal highlighted the ability of their forwards to open up space for their shuttling midfielders to make runs in behind the back four. Ambrose and Wilson were again tight on Matri and Vucinic respectively. Matri checked for the ball back into midfield, forcing Ambrose to follow his run and leaving acres of space to the right of Wilson. Marchisio darted past Brown into that space and Matri provided him with a clever flick that the midfielder dutifully dispatched. You can see a screen shot of the build up to the goal below. Marchisio sees Matri making his run into midfield and immediately begins his run in behind as Peluso plays the ball into Matri.

At 2-0 the tie looked done and dusted. When Ambrose was caught in possession in the 83rd, allowing Juve to tack on a third, all doubt was erased as to Celtic's fate in the final 16.

Note: I didn't quite find the time to analyze the Juventus defense versus Celtic attack- obviously quite an important feature of the game given 40% of the game took place in Juve's defensive third. Hopefully I'll have time in the next couple days to revisit this post and add more on that.

Liverpool miss Sturridge's vertical threat in loss to WBA

West Brom produced an unlikely 2-0 victory over Liverpool at Anfield despite taking 20 fewer shots and being outpossessed 59% to 41%. The home side missed a slew of decent opportunities before Gareth McAuley's header put the Baggies ahead on 81 minutes, including Ben Foster's penalty save on Steven Gerrard in the 77th.

Despite controlling the balance of play and managing to force Foster into a couple of fine saves, Liverpool lacked a bit of industry in the final third, largely owing to the absence of Daniel Sturridge to a thigh problem.

Luis Suarez took up the center forward position recently occupied by Sturridge while Jonjo Shelvey played in the hole behind him. Jordan Henderson was used as a left sided attacker and Stewart Downing played on the right wing. As he so often does when lined up as the main striker, Luis Suarez would drop off the opposition center backs and collect the ball between the lines. He's tremendous at drifting into defensive seams, turning and running at the back four. However, without Sturridge's pace, Liverpool lacked anyone making runs in behind the West Brom center backs for balls to be played through. When Suarez collected the ball between the lines, no one made the type of interior run in behind that might threaten Jonas Olsson and McAuley. As a result, one center back could step to Suarez while the other sat in to provide cover.

Sturridge often tends to remain high up the pitch on the shoulder of one center back. When Suarez plays in the hole behind him and manages to get the ball in the seams it forces the free opposition center back to step out to him and opens space for Sturridge to make a diagonal run into the space opened up by the center back moving out to Suarez. Without a vertical option in behind the defense, Liverpool often shuffled the ball wide to the right where Downing and Glen Johnson looked to combine and get crosses in the box. The two combined for 17 crosses, with Downing alone crossing 13 times. Several of Downing's balls in were excellent but without a physical #9 like Andy Carroll in the side, getting the ball wide and crossing it into the box is never likely to be an effective strategy for Liverpool. Olsson and McAuley are more comfortable dealing with high balls into the area than with pacey forwards running in behind them. Only two of Downing and Johnson's 17 crosses found a Liverpool player, despite a number of them being quality balls in.

Liverpool produced some decent football at times and will feel unfortunate to have failed to take anything from a game in which West Brom produced virtually nothing offensively for the first 80 minutes. However, the absence of Sturridge's pace meant they were often forced to attack down the wings and send 50-50 balls into the box- a difficult strategy when you're playing without an actual number nine. It was no surprise then that they produced some of their best chances, including Luis Suarez winning the penalty, when Fabio Borini came on at striker and Suarez dropped into the withdrawn role. Sturridge is a more suitable center forward than Borini however and Brendan Rodgers will be keen to have him back in action. It's incredible that Liverpool have still failed to manage a win against a side in the top 10.

Klinsmann gets second half adjustments wrong

The United States' World Cup qualifying campaign got off to a troubling start in San Pedro Sula as Honduras overcame an early Clint Dempsey goal to emerge 2-1 winners. Despite fielding an offensive 4-3-3 formation, Jurgen Klinsmann's side were cautious in the first half and created few quality goalscoring chances throughout the 90 minutes.

4-3-3
Klinsmann surprisingly left veteran and team captain Carlos Bocanegra out of the back four, opting instead for a center back pairing of Geoff Cameron and Omar Gonzalez. With Timmy Chandler and Fabian Johnson taking up the fullback positions, the back four was comprised of four players taking part in their first qualifying campaign. It was a brave decision on the part of Klinsmann to go with youth over experience- and Bocanegra's replacement Omar Gonzalez was one of the US's better players- but we're left to wonder whether Bocanegra would have provided the organization at the back to prevent Jerry Bengston's second half winner.

Danny Williams sat in midfield just in front of the back four. Michael Bradley and Jermaine Jones played as shuttling midfielders higher up the pitch.

Jozy Altidore was given the start at center forward. Clint Dempsey occupied a narrow position on the right and Eddie Johnson played a bit wider on the left.

The US started the game cautiously, with the midfield dropping fairly deep and allowing Honduras to to circulate the ball around the back. When Honduras had the ball deep in their own half, Dempsey and Johnson would push up alongside Altidore so that the US defended with a forward bank of 3 in front of a midfield bank of 3 in front of the back four. Strangely, the front 3 didn't press Honduras's back four and instead only offered token pressure. With plenty of time on the ball, the Honduran back four were easily able to advance the ball past the forward three. At this point, Dempsey and Eddie Johnson would drop in alongside Jones and Bradley to form a midfield bank of four. Williams dropped in to fill the gap between the defensive and midfield banks of four- making the US defensive shape more or less a deep 4-1-4-1. That the US didn't press wasn't a surprise. In an away qualifier Klinsmann was always going to be cautious and the 90 degree temperature would have made pressing unsustainable. However, it was a bit strange Dempsey and Johnson didn't immediately drop off into the midfield when the US lost possession.

The deep 4-1-4-1 shape meant Altidore was often left isolated up front. Honduras pressed when the US won the ball back, A combination of Honduras's pressing and some untidy passing from the US made it difficult to possess the ball out of the back and advance up the pitch with short passes. As a result, the US were frequently forced play long into Altidore and hope he could retain possession long enough for reinforcements to join in the attack. When the US were able to keep the ball, Dempsey drifted centrally from the right just in behind Altidore while Johnson stayed wider on the left. They looked most dangerous when Altidore checked back to collect the ball in between the lines of Honduras's 4-4-2. This forced one of the Honduran center backs to step out with him, leaving a hole in the center of the Honduras defense for the US to play balls in behind for Dempsey and Johnson making runs from the outside.

Honduras's opener came from a spectacular overhead kick from Juan Garcia but the corner kick that ultimately led to the goal was a result of Honduras's pressing and a lapse of concentration from Chandler who had a difficult afternoon. Chandler failed to clear his lines inside his own box, allowing Carlos Costly to nick possession. Gonzalez made a fine last ditch tackle on Costly but Garcia scored on the resulting corner.

Diamond 4-4-2
The US set out in the second half in a what would typically be described as a diamond 4-4-2 but what in reality was more 4-2-2-2. Bradley dropped deep alongside Williams and looked to collect the ball from Cameron and Gonzalez and link passes forward to Dempsey and Jones who were playing narrow higher up the field. Eddie Johnson played alongside Altidore as a center forward pairing. Bradley was given the deeper role because he's a more creative passer than Williams- the US needed a more creative player in that role to link defense to the four more advanced attackers.

Presumably Klinsmann made the tactical switch to enable the US to control possession by playing with four midfielders in the center of the field. Honduras had 57% possession in the first half and Klinsmann likely wanted to take the game to them more in the second half. While the switch did result in the US keeping the ball better in midfield, the lack of any wide players allowed plenty of space for Honduras's midfielders to run into when they regained possession.

Flat 4-4-2
Maurice Edu replaced Williams in a like for like sub on 58 minutes. Sacha Kljestan was brought on for Eddie Johnson a minute later, prompting another tactical change from Klinsmann. Kljestan played wide on the left, Jones went to right midfield and Dempsey moved up front alongside Altidore in a 4-4-2. Graham Zusi, a player used to being employed on the right wing for the US, replaced Jones in the 68th minute. The US defended in two banks of four- Edu and Bradley were side by side- while Altidore and Dempsey stayed high up the field. The switch meant the US no longer had the extra center midfielder to fill in the space between the two banks of four- the position Danny Williams had played in the first half.

Two things were almost immediately noticeable when Klinsmann made the switch. Without the extra center midfielder, Honduras began to find space to collect the ball in the gap between Bradley-Edu and Gonzalez-Cameron, leaving the US back four dangerously exposed. The absence of a third center midfielder also meant there was a huge gap in the middle of the field between Bradley and Edu and Dempsey and Altidore when the US were on the ball. With Edu and Bradley deep and Dempsey and Altidore high up the field, they had no one to fill the space in between and provide a link from midfield to attack. After falling behind 2-1, the US couldn't regain possession and when they did they struggled to keep it long enough to create anything meaningful. The olé chants that came from the home crowd as their side easily passed the ball around the US midfield in the closing moments of regulation time were a frustrating reminder of Klinsmann's frequently inability to get his tactics and personnel decisions right in important games.