Saturday, December 29, 2012

Review: Arsenal 7-3 Newcastle

Theo Walcott bagged a hat trick as Arsenal hit Newcastle with four unanswered goals in the final 20 minutes to give the Gunners a wild 7-3 win. Had Olivier Giroud's late header off the woodwork been a few inches lower, it would have tied the record of 11 for most goals in a Premier League match (Portsmouth beat Reading 7-4 in September of 2007).

It was a match that typified the first half of the 2012-2013 Barclay's Premier League season- plenty of action and drama but desperately lacking in convincing team performances and tactical intelligence. That 10 goals were produced was a shock given the rather dismal performance of both sides in the first 45 minutes- the scoreline is more a reflection of silly mistakes and perhaps fatigue than any scintillating team display. With both teams fielding three man central midfields and getting numbers behind the ball defensively, neither side was able to dominate the midfield in the opening 45 minutes and the game was played at a remarkably slow pace by Premier League standards.

Team tactics played virtually no role in the game and there was very little tactical development over the course of 90 minutes. There was some fine finishing on display, with Walcott in particular deserving of praise for an excellent performance, but lapses in concentration on defense were largely responsible for the bulk of goals. With the scoreline at 3-3, all 6 goals could be blamed on silly errors (footytube highlights here):

  • 1-0 Arsenal. Danny Simpson pushes forward from his right fullback position to join a Newcastle attack. The Magpies lose possession. Arsenal look to counter quickly through Podolski who had burst into the space behind Simpson. Cazorla hits a pass behind Podolski forcing him to turn around and put his back to goal to retrieve the ball. This allows Simpson time to recover. But rather than pressing Podolski and forcing him to go backwards, he continues to retreat towards his own goal, allowing the German winger the space to turn, lift his head and slot a through ball to Walcott.
  • 1-1. Bacary Sagna makes a silly foul on Papiss Cisse in a dangerous area just outside the box.
  • 2-1 Arsenal. A horribly underthrown throw in from Danny Simpson falls to the head of Podolski- he's able to play his header forward to Cazorla whose pass to Oxlade-Chamberlain is finished off well by the Arsenal teenager. I realize it sounds like I'm looking for someone to blame pinning the goal on a throw in but watch the highlights at 2:18: it really is a dreadful throw in that gets nowhere near a Newcastle player.
  • 2-2. Sylvain Marveaux is 40 yards from goal when Obertan collects the ball on the left wing in the build up to Newcastle's second goal. He makes a casual run towards the back post as Obertan dribbles at Sagna. Not a single Arsenal player notices his run in the entire sequence and he's allowed to tap in the simplest of goals unmarked at the back post.
  • 3-2 Arsenal. Tiote is carelessly nicked of possession by Wilshere in midfield leading to an Arsenal counter that ends in Podolski's tap in header. Wilshere did excellently to close in on the Ivorian midfielder but Tiote got his first touch stuck under his feet leaving him unable to get rid of the ball before Wilshere could pounce.
  • 3-3. Marveaux bursts forward with the ball from midfield. Sagna and Wilshere have the chance to double team for Arsenal at the 18. The two fail to communicate and both back off allowing Marveaux to pick his head up and play a clever ball to Ba at the back post with the outside of his foot. Gibbs was guilty of ball watching and switching off on Ba.
Arsenal's fourth was the first goal of the game that had more to do with the team shape of the attacking team than mistakes by the defensive team. Throughout the second half Podolski had been tucking inside on the left, forcing Danny Simpson to track him into the middle of the box and leaving space for Gibbs to overlap in the channel.  On the fourth, Podolski mad a run into the center of the box. Simpson followed and Gibbs dutifully made the overlapping run into space and provided the cut back for Walcott to smash home.

Arsenal's fifth, sixth and seventh goals came when the game had become very open. That Walcott had a hand in all three was no surprise. His pace and ability to run in behind defense is suited for open games, something he stated himself in the post match interview. He turned provider for Olivier Giroud for the fifth and sixth goals and finished off his hat trick in style with a slaloming run into the box for the seventh.


Saturday, December 22, 2012

Tactical Analysis: Arsenal 1-0 Wigan Athletic

A 60th minute Mikel Arteta penalty after Theo Walcott had been clipped by Jean Beausejour in the box gave Arsenal a 1-0 win over Wigan. On the balance of play Arsenal may have been fortunate to emerge with the three points and that was largely because Roberto Martinez got his tactics spot on while Arsene Wenger made a questionable substitution that nearly cost the Gunners. A defensive mistake from  Beausejour and poor delivery from wide areas proved costly for Wigan

Wigan started in their normal 3-4-3. Martinez didn't have any of his first choice center backs available so dropped James McCarthy back from midfield to play at the center of the back three. David Jones played alongside James McArthur in the center of midfield.

Wenger stuck with the same lineup he used in Monday evening's 5-2 win at Reading. Theo Walcott was employed at center forward while Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain played wide on the right.

The most interesting tactical feature of the game was Wigan's use of their back three. Because Arsenal were in a 4-2-3-1, Wigan had a 3 v. 1 advantage in the center of defense and therefore had two spare center backs. The two man advantage at the back also meant they were short a man in the center of midfield. To even the numbers in the midfield, McCarthy stepped into the midfield in front of the "outside" center backs Boyce and Figueroa and man marked Santi Cazorla. Wigan still had a spare man at center defense- Boyce and Figueroa were 2 v. 1 with Walcott in deeper areas. Wigan's wing backs picked up Arsenal's wide forwards. In effect, defensively Wigan were playing with a back four of Stam, Boyce, Figueroa and Beausejour with McCarthy playing a holding midfield role tracking Cazorla between the seams. Then when Wigan won possession Beausejour and Stam would push high up the pitch from their wing back positions and McCarthy would drop between Figueroa and Boyce to form a back three. This is very similar to the way Barcelona play with McCarthy playing the Sergio Busquets role.

The strategy worked to stifle Cazorla's offensive contribution. He played the pass that led to Walcott being awarded the penalty but aside from that he had a relatively quiet afternoon with McCarthy constantly tracking his movement.

Offensively, Wigan tried to overload Arsenal in wide areas with their wing backs and wide forwards looking to get Arsenal's fullbacks in 1 v. 2 situations. With Arsenal's wide forwards often failing to track Beausejour and Stam defensively, the two Wigan wing backs were often able to get the ball in space on the flanks. However, their delivery from wide areas was poor all afternoon.

Wenger made the game's first substitution on 75 minutes, replacing Podolski with Coquelin. Cazorla moved to the left and Coquelin played in the middle of midfield. I assume Wenger made the substitution to give the Gunners some extra bite in the middle of the pitch but Wigan were mainly threatening from the wings- it was a poor decision from Wenger and one that nearly proved costly. Cazorla is not good at tracking runners defensively and helping his fullbacks. Within minutes of making the change Stam had blown past Cazorla and received the ball in space down the right wing. Again his final delivery was poor but Wenger's decision to move Cazorla to the left nearly cost Arsenal. Finally, in the 90th minute he brought on Koscielny for Cazorla to provide Gibbs with some protection on the left. It was a substitution he should have made immediately when he had taken off Podolski.

That Wigan lost was no fault of Martinez who got his tactics spot on and frustrated Arsenal defensively for large parts of the game while threatening down the wings. However, they lacked the final delivery needed and still could use a center forward that is lethal in front of goal.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Arteta's role in Arsenal attack understated yet vital

Mikel Arteta certainly isn't one of Arsenal's flashiest players in attack. His contribution in the final third of the pitch tends to be several square balls played into the channels. He has only two league assists and two of his three league goals have come from the penalty spot. The one goal he scored from open play was controversially given despite the fact he appeared to be in an offside position.

Those are hardly overwhelming statistics but they mask just how vital the Spaniard is to the Arsenal attack. It's easy to brush over the offensive contribution of a player whose offensive game mostly revolves around unglamorous, high percentage two touch passes. While it's easy, and indeed correct, to say his significance to the Gunners attack lies in his ability to sit just in front of the back four, circulating passes from side to side and dictating tempo, it's much more difficult to quanitfy how those skills make Arsenal a better attacking side.

Tempo in possession is important to any football team- teams that fail to move the ball quickly are easy to defend. Tempo is particularly important in Arsene Wenger's possession-based philosophy. Arsenal have never been a physically strong team that uses powerful midfielders to jam the ball down their opponents throats (like, for instance, the Chelsea teams that played 4-3-3 under Mourinho and Ancelotti). Their attack is based around intelligent movement off the ball and keeping the ball moving from player to player quickly.

It is Arteta's ability to keep the Gunners passing tempo high that is his main asset to Wenger. He finds space just in front of his back four and behind Arsenal's more advanced midfielders and provides his teammates with an easy pass when no other option is available. He generally receives the ball deep in midfield and plays a simple pass to a teammate with a touch or two. Rarely is he playing a defense splitting 35 yard through ball- it all looks rather ordinary on television and he doesn't seem especially threatening to opposition defenses. However, he allows Arsenal to continually move the ball at pace. With Arteta consistently providing an easy passing option, he prevents his teammates from being forced to hold on to the ball while they wait for a pass to open up- a situation that makes a team static and easy to defend. An unmarked Arteta allows Arsenal to keep the ball moving quickly and forces the opposition defense to shift as quickly as the ball moves.

Lately opposing teams have picked up on Arteta's importance to the Arsenal attack and employed either an attacking midfielder or forward to deny Arsenal easy passes into the Spaniard. As a result, Arsenal's movement has been much slower and they've become a more static, predictable side. In Arsenal's 17 league games, Arteta has completed more than 80 passes in nine games and fewer than 80 passes in seven games. In those games he's had fewer than 80 passes Arsenal have won twice, drawn 3 and lost 3 for an average of 1.13 points per game and are averaging just 0.75 goals per game. In games he's had more than 80 passes the Gunners have 5 wins, a single defeat and 3 draws for an average of 2.00 points per game and are averaging 2.78 goals per game. This is a remarkable difference made all the more staggering by the controversial nature of the only two wins Arsenal have picked up when Arteta has completed fewer than 80 passes. The first was a 1-0 win over QPR when Arteta picked up the winner in the final 10 minutes despite replays showing he was offside. The second was their recent 2-0 win over West Brom when a controversial penalty given for a clear Santi Cazorla dive changed the complexion of the game. Arsenal weren't especially threatening in either game. Aside from their two penalties against West Brom they could only muster one other shot on goal. 

Teams will by now have picked up on the fact that denying easy passes into Arteta makes Arsenal static. It was shocking last night to see Reading leave him unmarked for the duration of the game. While Brian McDermott's side had more problems than just how they defended Arteta, particularly their defense on Arsenal's left flank, it was telling that Arsenal's most fluid offensive performance in some time coincided with the Spaniard ending a four game spell in which he'd failed to complete 80 passes (he completed 93 last night). It'll be interesting to see how the Gunners adjust moving forward as more sides look to take Arteta out of games. As important as quick ball movement is to the club, it'll be crucial they find another way to dictate tempo.

Monday, December 17, 2012

Manchester City 3-1 Newcastle: Pardew goes 4-4-2, leaves Y. Toure free

The main tactical feature of this game was Alan Pardew's decision to set out in a 4-4-2 rather than a 4-3-3. This was a bit of a surprise. Pardew tends to be quite concerned about being outnumbered in midfield and nearly always lines up with as many center midfielders as the opposition. Knowing Roberto Mancini would line up in what is basically a 4-2-3-1, with Aguero behind main striker Tevez, Nasri and David Silva drifting in very narrow from the wings and Toure and Garcia occupying the holding midfield roles, it seemed likely Pardew would opt for for the additional body in midfield provided by the 4-3-3 to better allow his team to compete in the center of the pitch.

However, given Newcastle's recent problems offering Ba support high up the field, it's easy to understand Pardew's thinking. I mentioned several times over the last week how direct Newcastle have become in the absence of Yohan Cabaye- Newcastle's most creative center midfielder and one capable of linking defense to offense through the center of the park. Hatem Ben Arfa did an excellent job in the second half of the game with Fulham tucking inside from his position on the right wing to provide that link but with Ben Arfa also out with an injury it was always likely Newcastle would have to play their fair share of long balls forward out of the back. Had Ba been the loan center forward in a 4-3-3/4-5-1 he'd have been isolated after receiving those long balls and would have had the difficult task of holding the ball up until his midfielders could join the attack.  By pairing Cisse alongside him as a front two, Ba either had a passing option or could flick long balls on to Cisse running in behind.

Defensively, Pardew's 4-4-2 meant at least one of Manchester City's holding midfielders was left free to receive passes in deeper midfield areas. Had he gone with a 4-3-3 the midfields would have matched up evenly: Gutierrez would have likely picked up Toure, Anita would have picked up Garcia and Tiote would have tracked Aguero in the space just in front of the back four. Instead Pardew paired the defensive-minded James Perch alongside Tiote and both sat in deep to protect the back four and prevent City's four creative attacking players from receiving the ball in pockets of space between the seams. This meant Garcia and Toure were free to receive the ball deep in midfield but this wasn't a huge concern to Newcastle- their plan was to form two compact banks of four between the ball and their goal and force City to try to patiently break them down.

Again, Pardew's reasoning for playing two deep center midfielders and leaving Garcia and Toure free near midfield was sound. He was trying to keep the defense compact and deny City space between the seams where Aguero, Silva and Nasri thrive. Secondly, had he gone with a 4-3-3, Gutierrez would have been responsible for joining the attack from his shuttling left center midfield position and then running back defensively to track Toure. Anytime Toure was able to break past him with one of his trademark powerful runs from midfield, Newcastle wouldn't have had the spare holding midfielder to pick him up. The hope was the holding midfield pairing of Perch and Tiote would keep the defense more compact and deny Toure the space to dribble forward from midfield. In effect, Pardew was betting Toure was more likely to be dangerous dribbling in behind the Newcastle midfielders than he was receiving passes in space deep in midfield and looking for a penetrating pass in behind the defense.

However, on 10 minutes Toure would prove otherwise. He received the ball near midfield and, with no one closing him down, had time to pick his head up and play a perfectly weighted, curling through ball to Nasri in behind the Newcastle defense (certainly one of the passes of the season thus far). Nasri did brilliantly himself to unselfishly lay the ball off for Aguero to tuck away into an empty net. Following the goal, Manchester City began to stamp their authority on the game with Toure, Tevez, Aguero, Silva and Nasri combining some tidy passes around the penalty area to create a few good goal scoring chances. The amount of space Newcastle's 4-4-2 was affording Toure was becoming an increasing problem. Their back four was getting deeper and deeper as the half progressed. With Perch and Tiote continuing to help the back four pick up the runs of Nasri, Silva, Tevez and Aguero, Toure was allowed to receive the ball in more advanced positions. Shortly after City's opener Toure received a pass 25 yards from goal and was again able to slip it behind the defense to Nasri. Nasri's pass across the face of goal just eluded Tevez at the back post but it was becoming clear Toure was more then capable of ripping Newcastle apart with his passing. At that point it appeared that if Pardew didn't make the change to a three man central midfield and find someone to stick tight to Toure, City would put 4 or 5 in. Garcia headed in their second on 38 minutes and the Manchester side went into the dressing room up 2-0.

Newcastle's approach throughout the game was fairly consistent. They played plenty of direct balls into Cisse and Ba, looking to use the height and power of the two Senegalese forwards to overwhelm Nastisic and Kolo Toure. They looked to get the ball wide to either the outside midfielders or outside backs and hit early crosses into the box. They played an incredible 41 crosses, 30 more than City. After being dominated in the first half the Magpies were much more threatening in the second. Their approach was unsophisticated- they continued playing long balls and crosses into their forwards and looked to win corners and set pieces where they could allow their two center backs to get forward into the box. However, they also did a much better job putting pressure on City higher up the field and winning the ball back quickly. After Ba's header made it 2-1 they looked capable of adding an equalizer. That hope quickly diminished however when Toure added a third for City.

In the end Newcastle could be proud of the spirit they showed in the second half but the better team won this game. Pardew's decision to play a 4-4-2 made life uncomfortable for City's center backs at one end of the pitch but also gave Yaya Toure far too much time and space at the other. In the end he was the game's key player.



Thursday, December 13, 2012

Preview: Newcastle vs. Manchester City

Both sides come into this game struggling to find form. Newcastle have won just one in their last ten while Manchester City have won one in their last six.

City will be missing Alexander Kolarov and Micah Richards due to injury while Gareth Barry is suspended. James Milner, Vincent Kompany and Jack Rodwell are all listed as doubtful with Milner the most likely of the three to be available.


Yohan Cabaye, Steven Taylor, Ryan Taylor and Dan Gosling remain injured for Newcastle. Gabriel Obertan may be fit enough to make the subs bench.

Last Season's Tactical Battle
Manchester City picked up a massive 2-0 win on their last visit to St. James Park in the penultimate game of their title-winning campaign last season. It was a tense game fought largely in a crowded center of the pitch. Roberto Mancini started that game with Aguero, Nasri, David Silva and Tevez as an attacking four. Tevez was the striker with Aguero playing in the seams just behind him, Silva in a narrow position on the left and Nasri narrow on the right. Newcastle were in a 4-3-3 so as City advanced the ball towards the attacking third the game became extremely narrow. With Newcastle's powerful holding midfielder Cheik Tiote sitting in deep to protect his back four, the four diminutive City attackers struggled to find space in the middle of the pitch to string together dangerous passing combinations.

After 60 minutes the score was still level at 0-0. Remember, at this time City were level on points with Manchester United and were in pole position to win the title only because of their superior goal difference. They needed the three points from this fixture to beat their neighbors to the title. Chasing a win, Roberto Mancini made what at the time seemed a bizarre tactical change. Barry and Yaya Toure had started the game as a deep lying holding midfield pair in front of the back four. On 62 minutes Mancini replaced Nasri, a creative attacking player, with a third holding midfielder, Nigel De Jong. He pushed Toure high up the pitch alongside Aguero while De Jong sat alongside Barry in front of the back four. Toure's powerful physical presence in a more advanced role allowed City to dominate Newcastle higher up the pitch. In the 70th minute he played a 1-2 with Aguero just outside the penalty area and struck a curling right foot shot into the net. He added a second from a counter attack in the 89th to secure the win. A week later City clinched the title.

More of the same this season?
Click on diagram for a larger image
Saturday's match may well have some similar features to the one last season. In all likelihood, Alan Pardew will again field a 3-man central midfield to prevent his side from being dominated in the center of the park. We could again see Nasri and David Silva in narrow positions to the right and left of Aguero respectively for City with Tevez at center forward. With Silva and Nasri tucking in towards the middle and Newcastle fielding a center midfield triangle, we could once again see play become condensed into a crowded center of the pitch as City advance the ball into the attacking third.

The midfields will match up fairly evenly if the sides play their expected formations and lineup as shown in the diagram. Tiote will pick up Aguero (or whoever plays off the main striker), Gutierrez will pick up Garcia and Anita will pick up Y. Toure. As Nasri and Silva drift infield, Newcastle's outside backs, Santon and Simpson, will have to follow their runs which will open space on the flanks for City's fullbacks to overlap into. If City are able to consistently keep possession high up the pitch and give their fullbacks time to push forward, it'll force Newcastle's outside attacking players (Cisse and Ben Arfa in the diagram) to track their runs. If their outside attackers are consistently forced to track back, the Magpies will struggle to transition forward when they do regain possession and will be forced to hit long direct balls into an isolated Demba Ba.

If Pardew is concerned about providing protection for his outside backs he may opt for more of a 4-5-1 than a 4-3-3, employing more defensive wide midfielders to track the forward runs of City's fullbacks. This formation would likely see Sylvain Marveaux replace Gutierrez on the left side of the center midfield triangle, Guttierez move to the left wing, Ben Arfa shuffle across to his more natural right wing and Cisse would be relegated to the bench. While this formation will better protect Newcastle's fullbacks, it'll likely exacerbate the problem of leaving Ba isolated up the field. 

If Mancini expects his fullbacks to have opportunities to get in possession high up the pitch on the flanks he may opt for Dzeko as the main striker to provide an aerial threat for crosses in from the wings. If he feels he needs to move Y. Toure into an attacking position as the game progresses while still retaining two deep holding midfielders as he did last season, he could bring on James Milner to sit alongside Garcia.

Newcastle Desperately Missing Cabaye
Last season, Cabaye was the creative presence in Newcastle's midfield three. In his absence they've struggled to link defense to offense through the midfield and have instead resorted to hitting long balls from the back towards Ba. Without this creative presence in the center of midfield tomorrow, Newcastle will once again likely hit their fair share of long balls (they're the most direct team in the Premier League this season) into Ba. The Senegalese forward will have to be effective in his hold up play to allow the midfield time to get forward. If he struggles to hold the ball up Newcastle will spend the bulk of the game pinned into their own half.

In the second half of their 2-1 defeat to Fulham, Newcastle moved to a 4-4-2. Ben Arfa was moved to right wing but he played incredibly narrow, moving centrally just behind the two center forwards almost as a #10. He did an excellent job linking play with the forwards and Newcastle enjoyed their best spell of the game after making this change. Ben Arfa netted an equalizer drifting in from the right before being subbed off. Perhaps Pardew will again look for the creative French midfielder to tuck inside to provide Newcastle with some creativity and an extra body to compete in the center of midfield.

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Tactical Analysis: Juventus 1-0 Cagliari (Coppa Italia)

Giovinco pounced on a Cagliari defensive mistake to give Juventus a 1-0 win that sees them through to the quarterfinals of the Coppa Italia in manager Antonio Conte's first home game since serving his match fixing suspension. Juventus were the better side but it was fitting the goal came from a mistake: apart from an early spell in which the bianconeri looked threatening this was a drab encounter.

Both sides rested a number of their regular first team players. Cagliari played a 4-2-3-1 while Juventus were in their usual 3-5-2. The starting lineups are in the diagram on the left.

The midfield match up was fairly straight forward- Cagliari's holding midfielders Ekdal and Erikkson matched up with Juventus's shuttling center midfielders Vidal and Padoin respectively and Cepellini, Cagliari's attacking midfielder, matched up with Juventus's holding midfielder Pogba.

In the central attacking zones, Juve's forwards matched up 2 v. 2 with the Cagliari center backs meaning the visiting team didn't have a spare center back to provide cover. At the other end, Juventus had three center backs to Cagliari's one forward.

There were three important tactical features to this game: (1) Cagliari's early decision to leave Pogba unmarked in midfield and their subsequent adjustment dropping Cepellini in to defend him, (2) the movement of Juventus's two forwards, and (3) Cagliari's inability to take advantage of their numerical advantage on the flanks.

Pogba
In the opening 20-25 minutes Cagliari made the decision to leave Pogba unmarked as the deepest player in Juventus's midfield triangle rather than dropping Cepellini in to defend him. Eriksson picked up Podoin, Ekdal picked up Vidal and Pogba was left to sit in space behind on his own. Presumably Cagliari head coach Ivo Pulga did this to allow Cepellini to drift in space behind Pogba and provide an out ball for counter attacks when they regained possession. Pogba doesn't have the same passing vision as Andrea Pirlo, the man he replaced in the lineup, and therefore Pulga wasn't overly concerned about him picking apart his defense with penetrating forward passes. But while Pogba didn't provide any devastating defense-splitting pass, he was doing an excellent job of funneling passes forward and dictating the tempo of the game. Juventus created more genuine scoring chances in the opening spell when Pogba was left unmarked than they did the remainder of the game.

Pulga eventually made the decision to drop Cepellini in to defend Pogba when Juve were in possession. Juventus's midfield passing immediately become much slower. Without the option of playing the ball to their unmarked holding midfielder, the bianconeri were frequently forced to play direct balls from the back three to the two forwards.

The negative side to this switch for Cagliari was that with Cepellini dropping in deep to defend, their loan forward Mauricio Pinilli was left isolated higher up the field when they won the ball back.

Movement of Juve Forwards
Because Cagliari were in a flat back four and Juventus used two center forwards, both center backs had to mark a forward. There was no spare center back to provide defensive cover. Against teams that play a flat four, Juventus consistently use the same strategy for their forwards' movement. One will make a run back into the midfield, forcing one of the opposition center backs to track him. The other will then make a diagonal run into the space that opens up a result. In the 8th minute Bendtner made the run into midfield with Rossettini following him from his center back position. Giovinco made the diagonal run into space and was put through on goal but missed his chance. He was put through on goal in the same fashion later in the half but was flagged for offsides.



Wide Areas
Cagliari's numerical advantage came on the flanks. With Juve's two wing backs their only players positioned in a wide area, Cagliari had a 2 v. 1 advantage on each flank. However, in order to make use of that advantage they needed their fullbacks to get forward and join in the attack to overload the Juve wing backs. This never happened because they were unable to keep possession long enough for Murro and Perico to get forward from their fullbacks positions.

Defensively, Cagliari kept their wide forwards Ribeiro and Ibarbo high up the pitch, opting to use Murro and Perico to mark Isla and De Ceglie. However, Juventus began to overload Murro. Padoin (who had switched to right-sided center mid after an injury to Vidal) and Giovinco would float towards Isla on the right channel, leaving Murro to defend 1 v. 2. Juve's goal came when they were able to overload Murro. Isla received a cross field ball that forced Murro to the touchline to defend him. Padoin floated towards Isla unmarked, received a ball near the corner of the 18 and slipped it into the box for Giovinco. The pass to Giovinco was initially intercepted by Rossettini but he failed to clear it before Giovinco could win the tackle and score. It was a scrappy goal but developed because Juventus were able to overload Murro on the right.



Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Tactical Analysis: Fulham 2-1 Newcastle

Hugo Rodallega's second half header gave Fulham a 2-1 win over Newcastle after two earlier deflected goals from Steve Sidwell and Hatem Ben Arfa had put the two teams level at 1-1.

Ben Arfa returned from injury for the Magpies and started the game as the left-sided attacking player in a 4-3-3. Jonas Gutierrez and Vurnon Anita played in front of Chiek Tiote in the middle of midfield and Papiss Cisse was again used as a right forward. Alan Pardew's defense was as expected.

Martin Jol selected Rodallega over Mladen Petric to pair with Berbatov at forward in Fulham's 4-4-2.

The tactical development of the game can be broken into three phases that were brought about by tactical and personnel changes from Pardew. In the first phase Newcastle started the game in a 4-3-3 yet were getting dominated in terms of possession despite having an extra midfielder and created few goalscoring opportunities of their own. In the second phase Pardew switched to a 4-4-2 with Ba and Cisse paired up top after Ba had become isolated in the 4-3-3. In the third phase Newcastle were chasing an equalizer and brought on Shola Ameobi to replace Ben Arfa and moved to what was basically three center forwards and began hitting everything long into the box for Ameobi, Ba and Cisse.

Newcastle start in 4-3-3
Newcastle's 4-3-3 meant they had a man advantage in midfield yet they were dominated in this zone. Offensively, Anita was usually picked up by Baird while Sidwell looked after Guttierez. With Berbatov and Rodallega generally staying high up the pitch for Fulham, Tiote was left free in deeper positions in midfield. However, the Ivorian is obviously more combative ball winner than creative passer in his holding midfield role and failed to play any penetrating passes into the final third when he got on the ball. His primary concern was maintaining a position where he could help his center backs slow down Fulham counterattacks when Newcastle lost possession. This was understandable but it also meant Newcastle's extra man in midfield didn't give them an advantage in the final third.

Baird and Sidwell did an excellent job for Fulham sitting in front of the back four and reading passing lanes and intercepting passes. Baird had 8 interceptions, more than twice as many as any player on the field.


Pardew is desperately missing the creativity of Yohan Cabaye in an advanced midfield position. Anita did well circulating the ball but isn't an especially dynamic player and Gutierrez is better on the left wing where he can run at defenders and whip in crosses. Without Cabaye's creative passing in midfield, Newcastle continue to struggle to link the midfield with Ba and have too often resorted to knocking longballs towards the Senegalese forward (this table I produced last week shows Newcastle plays a larger percentage of longballs than any other team).

Fulham's attack largely revolved around two strategies. Firstly,  Dimitar Berbatov dropped off into midfield to collect the ball and direct the Cottagers' moves forward. Secondly, with Newcastle's fullbacks getting into advanced positions, Fulham looked to counter attack down the channels with Rodallega often floating out wide to receive direct passes and break forward quickly. Berbatov did an excellent job getting his two wingers involved early on. Rodallega played more advanced and looked to create overloads for Newcastle's fullbacks by floating into the channels. Sidwell sprinted forward from midfield to join the attack. Fulham's first goal came when Rodallega drifted behind Santon on the right wing, forcing Coloccini out of central defense to follow him all the way to the right touchline. Rodallega slipped a pass towards the end line through to Duff who was able to cut the ball back and find Sidwell at the top of the box for the finish.

Pardew switches to 4-4-2
With Newcastle struggling to get players close enough to Ba for him to have a meaningful passing option, Pardew switched to a 4-4-2 around the 28th minute. Cisse moved alongside Ba up top. Ben Arfa switched to his more comfortable right midfield position and Gutierrez moved from the middle to his natural place on the left wing. Anita played in advance of Tiote in the middle of midfield.

Much has been made about the fact Ba and Cisse have never scored in the same game when both were on the pitch. However, the move to two up top seemed to make sense given Ba had been so isolated in the opening 28 minutes. Newcastle may have been concerned about becoming even more direct with only Anita and Tiote in the middle of midfield. However, Ben Arfa crucially began to tuck into the middle of the pitch from his right-sided position, playing almost as a #10, while Danny Simpson advanced from right back to provide width. Ben Arfa's movement into the middle gave Baird and Sidwell another defensive responsibility. They now had to track the movement of both Ben Arfa moving infield and Anita shuffling forward, meaning one of them was no longer spare to track runs of either Cisse or Ba back into midfield. As a result, Ba began to find space to drop off in between the seams, receive passes, turn and play through balls for Cisse in behind the defense. and the game became very even. A move in which Ba dropped off in front of the Newcastle center backs and slipped Cisse through on goal highlighted the Magpies new offensive potency (though Cisse had strayed into an offsides position and had hit the woodwork anyway). Ben Arfa was excellent providing the link between Newcastle's defense and the two forwards and was Newcastle's key player in the second half. His goal took a fortunate deflection but came when he had tucked inside and received a pass from Simpson on the right.

While Newcastle looked more dangerous after moving to a 4-4-2, Ba and Cisse still seem uncomfortable playing together as a center forward pair. Whereas Berbatov and Rodellega played 17 passes to one another, Ba and Cisse combined for just 5.

Fulham continued to try to counter into the flanks. Martin Jol made what would prove to be a key substitution in the 63rd minute, bringing on Ashkan Dejagah to replace Kacaniklic. Duff switched to the left and Dejagah occupied the right wing. With his first touches of the game, Dejagah was brought down on the right at the edge of the penalty area. Rodallega powerfully headed home the resulting Duff free kick.

Ben Arfa replaced
Trailing 2-1, Pardew replaced Ben Arfa with Shola Ameobi in the 71st, a move that presumably came down to a lack of match fitness for the Frenchman given he had been Newcastle's brightest player. Ameobi moved into the center of what was basically a center forward three for Newcastle with Ba slightly to the left and Cisse slightly to the right. Gutierrez stayed wide on the left while Simpson played very high up the pitch on the right as more of a right midfielder (Newcastle were basically in a flat 3-4-3). They looked to get the ball wide to Gutierrez and Simpson to play early crosses in towards the back post for the three towering forwards to attack. You wont witness a clearer example of route 1 football in a top flight European league. Hangeland and Hughes defended admirably at the center of the Fulham defense. Newcastle attempted 10 crosses after Ameobi's introduction but only one was successful.


Conclusion
Fulham's counterattacks were impressive. The combination of Berbatov's skillful buildup play and Rodallega's hard running worked to great effect. Newcastle were most dangerous when Ben Arfa drifted in space in the middle of the pitch and used his creativity to link with the forwards. Without a creative passer in the middle of midfield they become too direct. Pardew will therefore be desperate to have Cabaye back in the side.

Friday, December 7, 2012

Preview: Arsenal vs. West Brom


West Brom and Arsenal will look to get back to winning ways when they meet at the Emirates Saturday afternoon. Arsene Wenger's side are winless in their last three league games and sit 10th in the table, their worst start to a season in 18 years. Steve Clarke's Baggies have lost their last two but have had more to celebrate this season- despite the recent defeats West Brom are off to their best start to a Premier League campaign. They find themselves 5th in the table, level on 26 points with fourth place Spurs and 3rd place Chelsea. 

Wenger will have to deal with several injuries to first team regulars. Laurent Koscielny, Theo Walcott and Lukas Podolski will all be sidelined while Bacary Sagna is also doubtful. Carl Jenkinson will replace Sagna at right back. Aaron Ramsey may be given the start on the right in the absence of Walcott with Alex Oxlade-Chamberain expected to fill in for Podolski on the left. Wenger also has Tomas Rosicky and Gervinho available. He could opt to play Rosicky on a wing or in the hole behind Giroud and push Cazorla wide.

Boaz Myhill will fill in for the Baggies at goalkeeper for Ben Foster who is recovery from groin surgery.
 
A Clash of Styles
This game will showcase a clash of two very different playing styles. Arsenal build attacks patiently from the back, move forward as a unit and retain possession. West Brom defend deep and look to counter rapidly. Arsenal lead the league in possession, averaging 59.9% per game while West Brom are fourth from bottom with 43.5% per game.

Expect West Brom to drop their wide midfielders Odemwingie and Gera alongside Yacob and Mulumbu in defense to create a second bank of four. Jenkinson and Gibbs will join in the attack for Arsenal from their outside back positions, pushing Odemwingie and Gera further towards their own goal. Ramsey will likely tuck inside from his right midfield position, creating space for Jenkinson to overlap. Jack Wilshere will push forward towards Cazorla in possession and look to link defense to offense. The Gunners will look to create short combinations of passes around the penalty area and find gaps in West Brom's back four to slip the ball through. They need to do a better job of turning possession into genuine goal scoring chances. During their current three game winless streak their opponents have taken more shots on target in each game despite Arsenal winning the possession battle in all three games and completing more passes in the final third.

With Jenkinson and Gibbs pushing forward, West Brom will look to quickly counter in the space behind the two Arsenal outside backs when they regain possession. Shane Long will likely float into these wide channels to provide one option for an out ball. Gera and Odemwingie will also try to quickly break in behind Jenkinson and Gibbs. It'll be Morrison's job to quickly transition forward in the middle of the pitch and link with Long. With Wilshere moving in to more advanced positions in possession, Arteta will be responsible for slowing down counterattacks, particularly by denying Morrison opportunities to get on the ball in space. The Spaniard's positioning was incredibly poor on Swansea's opening goal last weekend when he completely switched off on attacking midfielder Michu and left him unmarked just in front of the Arsenal back four.

The screenshot below shows Arteta 15 yards to the left of Michu, moving into an area Arsenal already had well covered. Chico is able to clip a pass into Michu, forcing Vermaelen to step to ball and leave space in behind him. Michu plays a simple on-two with Luke Moore, breaks past the Dutch center back and coolly finishes the breakaway. Had Arteta been in the correct position in front of the back four, Vermaelen who have never had to step out, allowing space behind him for Michu to run into (in fact Michu wouldn't have even received the ball). Arteta will have to do a better job tracking Morrison when West Brom look to break.



Central Midfield Zone
As mentioned above, defensively West Brom will likely drop their wide midfielders Gera and Odemwingie alongside holding midfielders Yacob and Mulumbu to create a midfield bank of four. Against Chelsea's 4-2-3-1, Shane Long dropped alongside James Morrison to pick up Chelsea's two holding midfielders, Mikel and Romeu on that day, and left the center backs unmarked. Both Mikel and Romeu like to sit in front of the back four and circulate the ball sideways; neither are particularly strong at linking defense and attack either with their dribbling or forward passing. Their reluctance to push forward meant Long and Morrison could defend them fairly easily while still remaining high up the pitch in good counter attacking positions when West Brom regained possession. It also meant West Brom had a spare holding midfielder so Chelsea's attacking central midfielder (both Hazard and Sturridge played there for the Blues) was outnumbered. West Brom had a spare center back as well so in the central attacking zones Chelsea were outnumbered 2 v. 4. As a result, the Blues lacked a vertical passing option and were forced to play the ball sideways.

Arsenal will pair Jack Wilshere alongside Mikel Arteta at center midfield. Wilshere is more of a box-to-box midfielder than either Mikel or Romeu and will push higher up the pitch and do a better job of linking defense to offense. The Baggies will therefore have to decide if they want Morrison to track the forward movement of Wilshere so that they have a spare holding midfielder and can defend the dangerous Santi Cazorla 2 v. 1 higher up the pitch. If they do that Long will drop in and sit on Arteta. The danger for West Brom of playing like this is that they could get pushed too deep defensively and not have an out ball when they retain possession. Therefore I'd expect Morrison to pick up Arteta, leaving a 2 v. 2 match up higher up the field between Cazorla-Wilshere and Yacob-Mulumbu.

Arteta's role circulating the ball and dictating the tempo of the game is crucial for Arsenal. Team's that have kept him off the ball have had success against the Gunners- their ball movement becomes far too slow without his involvement. He averages 88 completed passes per game, second in the Premier League only to Michael Carrick. In games he's completed fewer than 80 passes Arsenal are averaging only 0.75 points per game (1 win, 3 losses, 3 draws) and 0.57 goals per game. In games he's completed more than 80 passes they're averaging 1.63 points per game (3 wins, 1 loss, 3 draws) and 2.5 goals per game. Clarke will therefore likely put an emphasis on using some combination of Morrison and Long to keep Arteta off the ball and prevent Arsenal from getting in any type of rhythm in possession.

Thursday, December 6, 2012

Ranking the Premier League's most direct teams (revisited)

In a post very early in the Barclay's Premier League season I presented a table ranking the league's teams according to how direct they played. The metric I used for these rankings was the number of short passes a team played per one long ball. The fewer short passes a team played per long ball, the more direct they were. I used this metric rather than the simpler long balls per game because long balls per game doesn't tell the complete story of how direct a team is. Teams with very low average possession statistics have less of the ball and are therefore likely to play a fewer number of all types of passes. For example, Stoke play the 11th most long balls per game but few would argue they are just the 11th most direct team in the league. They nearly always have less of the ball than their opponent and therefore play fewer total passes, both long and short.

In the table below I rank the teams by how direct they play after nearly four months of the season but this time around I've used a slightly different metric than short passes per long ball. Here I use the percent of total passes a team plays that are long balls. Total passes a team plays includes short passes, long balls, crosses and through balls [in other words my calculation was long balls/(long balls+short passes+crosses+through balls)*100]. According to this metric Newcastle are the most direct team in the league with 18.27% of their passes being long balls. Arsenal are the least direct- only 8.52% of their passes are long balls.

This table ranks Barclay's Premier League teams by the percent of passes each play that are long balls. Data courtest of whoscored.com

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Tactical Analysis: Juventus 1-0 Shakhtar Donetsk

Juventus emerged with a surprisingly comfortable 1-0 win in Ukraine over Shakhtar Donetsk to overtake their opponents for first place in group E and send Chelsea crashing out of the competition despite their 6-1 win over Nordsjealland.



Formations
There were no big surprises in the formation or starters for either side. Massimo Carrera (Antonio Conte) selected Giovinco over Quagliarelli to partner Vucinic up top. Eduardo started in place of the suspended Luiz Adriano at forward for Shakhtar. Juventus played their usual 3-5-2; Shakhtar played their usual 4-2-3-1.


Wide Play
One of the biggest tactical surprises was just how high up the pitch Juventus's wing backs were willing to move when in possession, particularly Lichtensteiner on the right. In my preview to this game I said I expected Lichtensteiner and Asamoah to stay a bit deeper in more of a defensive 5-3-2 since Juventus only needed a point to qualify. My thinking was that by having the two wing backs sit deeper, Juventus wouldn't open up space down the wings for Willian and Teixeira to counter into. But their more adventurous positioning turned out to be a great move from Conte. It forced Willian and Teixeira to drop deep into their own half alongside Shakhtar's holding midfielders, forming a second bank of four, and left Eduardo isolated against the three Juventus center backs when Shakhtar won possession back.

The positioning of Shakhtar's holding midfielders Fernandinho and Stepanenko played an important role in allowing Juventus to create overloads down the right flank. Fernandinho was positioned in his normal spot towards the right side in the center of midfield. Defensively he was responsible for tracking Pogba. Stepanenko sat in front of the back four and tracked the runs of Vucinic and Giovinco back into midfield. I noted in my preview to the game Juventus like Vucinic to make runs back into midfield, pulling one center back along with him and opening up space for Giovinco to make runs in behind. You can therefore understand what Shakhtar were thinking placing Stepanenko just in front of the center backs- he could track Vucinic's runs into midfield, allowing Kutcher and Rakitskiy to retain their shape in the center of defense. However, this also left Vidal unmarked for Juventus at right center midfield. He was able to freely push forward, forcing left back Rat to pick him up when he got the ball. This opened up space for Lichtensteiner to make overlapping runs around the outside (see diagram above). For Juventus's goal it was Vucinic and not Vidal who had shuffled right forcing Rat to close down on him but the idea was the same. It allowed Lichtensteiner the space to get around the outside and cross for Giovinco to finish. 

Juve's 3 v. 1 Advantage at the Back
The fact Juventus's three center backs were only occupied with one Shakhtar center forward played a key role in the game. It meant Eduardo was always going to struggle to get on the ball and that there were no gaps in the center of the Juventus defense to play balls in behind. Having two spare center backs also proved crucial in dealing with Willian and Fernandinho when they were able to dribble past Juventus's three central midfielders. When the two talented Brazilians were able to break behind the Juventus midfield, one of the two spare center backs was able to close them down. This still left Juventus with one center back to man mark Eduardo and another spare center back to provide cover. The box was simply too crowded for Shakhtar to create much down the middle.

Giovinco and Vucinic Movement
Because Juventus were playing with two forwards in Vucinic and Giovinco, it was 2 v. 2 at the back for Shakhtar's center backs Rakitskiy and Kutcher. When Shakhtar lost possession, one of the two Juventus forwards would float to space in the channels left open when Rat and Srna pushed forward to join in the attack. Juventus would hit long balls into this space on the counter, forcing one of Shakhtar's center backs into a wide area to close down the ball. This created huge gaps between the Shakhtar center backs for either the other forward or Vidal and Pogba to run into. In the first half Vucinic collected a long ball in space on the right, forcing Rakitskiy wide to close him down. This left Giovinco in space at the edge of the box but he put his excellent chance wide.

Conclusion
Juventus's movement was clever all over the field. 3-5-2 can be quite an effective formation to play against 4-2-3-1 and today's game demonstrated this perfectly. Shakhtar had no spare center back to provide cover and their center forward was outnumbered around the penalty box 1 to 3. Shakhtar's advantage should have been their unmarked fullbacks but neither Srna nor Rat were particularly effective moving forward. When they were able to get the ball in space on the wings, there were too many Juventus bodies in the box to provide a decisive delivery. Juventus were deserving winners.


Tactical Preview: Juventus vs. Shakhtar

Juventus's Champions League fate will be decided tonight as they head to Donetsk needing only a draw with Shakhtar to secure qualification into the knockout stage. A Juventus loss and a Chelsea win over Nordsjaelland in group E's other fixture will put the Blues through. Shakhtar have already wrapped up qualification.

Starting Lineups
Shakhtar will likely set out in their usual 4-2-3-1 formation. Juventus will be in their normal 3-5-2.

Antonio Conte's side will be aided by the suspension of Shakhtar center forward Luiz Adriano after he was suspended by UEFA for an unsporting goal he scored against Nordsjaelland. Former Arsenal striker Eduardo is expected to replace him. Tomas Hubschman is a doubt with a hamstring injury and will likely be replaced by Taras Stepanenko.

Paul Pogba is expected to fill in for the suspended Claudio Marchisio for Juventus and Conte will have to select two of Mirko Vucinic, Fabio Quagliarelli or Sebastian Giovinco to fill the two forward positions.

Shakhtar Fullbacks Unmarked
Needing only a draw in a difficult away environment Conte will likely ask his wing backs Kwadwo Asamoah and Stephan Lichtensteiner to be conservative with their positioning, staying fairly close to the back three in more of a 5-3-2 than a 3-5-2. The two will drop in to pick up Willian and Teixeira on the flanks, leaving Chiellini, Bonucci and Barzagli compact centrally to defend runs into the box. This means Shakhtar's outside backs Srna and Rat should be unmarked when they advance forward. Juventus will allow them to receive the ball on the flanks and focus their attention on crowding the box and winning balls played into the penalty area. Rat and Srna are both decent going forward but it will be interesting to see how adventurous they are with their positioning going forward- when they advance high up the field it will open space for Quagliarelli or Giovinco to float into and spring counters.

3 v.1 Advantage for Juventus at the Back
Juventus will have three center backs to deal with Shakhtar's loan center forward Eduardo. They had the same numerical advantage at the back against Chelsea, who like Shaktar play a 4-2-3-1, and it worked to their advantage. With three center backs Fernando Torres didn't have space to move laterally and collect the ball in the channels. Instead he had to check back into the midfield, taking him away from goal. Three central defenders will also make it difficult for Shakhtar to press. Shakhtar's three forwards can press the three center backs but they run the risk of leaving Asamoah and Lichtensteiner in space on the wings. To effectively press Shakhtar will need to stay quite compact and hold a very high line, leaving them vulnerable to balls played over the top from the back.

If instead Willian and Teixeira drop back and defend Lichtensteiner and Asamoah, as Chelsea did, this leaves Eduardo to defend the three center backs. In this case Bonucci, Barzagli and Chiellini will be able to comfortably play out from the back.

No Spare Center Back for Shakhtar
Juventus's use of two forwards means Shakhtar will not have a spare center back to provide cover. Against Chelsea, Juventus tried to draw one center back out of position by having Vucinic make runs into midfield. Giovinco (and later in the game Quaglierelli) would then make a diagonal run into space left open by the center back stepping out. Quaglierelli ultimately got the equalizer in this manner. The lack of a spare center back also means that Shakhtar's midfielders Fernandinho and Stepanenko will have to diligently track the forward runs of Pogba and Vital. If they allow Pogba or Vidal to get on the ball in behind them, one of their center backs will be forced to leave a forward unmarked and step to ball.

Conclusion
Expect Juventus to defend deep in a more of a 5-3-2 and try to escape with the point they need. They'll concede the wings to Shakhtar's fullbacks and look to crowd the penalty area to prevent any good chances in the box. Offensively, they'll look to spring counters through Quagliarelli or Giovinco floating to the flanks into space left open by the advancing Shakhtar fullbacks.

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Month of November Premier League form tables

The Barclay's Premier league season is certainly a marathon and not a sprint. Teams inevitably experience both rises and dips in form as the season progresses. Avoiding prolonged spells of poor form obviously define a team's season whether they're competing for a Champions League position or to avoid relegation.

The last month of the season has seen changes in fortune for a number of the league's 20 teams. Notably, Chelsea and Arsenal both went through difficult Novembers while the likes of Manchester United, Stoke City, Norwich and Swansea all performed well. The table below looks at the form of teams since the beginning of November, a time period in which each team has played 6 league games. It ranks clubs by the number of points they've accumulated during this time.

Manchester United are currently the league's in form team having accumulated 15 points out of 18 possible. More surprisingly, Stoke City have been the league's second best team over the last 6 games- they've collected 13 points, a run of form that has seen them jump four places from 13th to 9th in the league. By contrast, November was an unkind month for West London clubs. After an excellent start to the season, Chelsea have picked up just 4 points since the end of October, placing them in a three way tie with Sunderland and Newcastle for the third worst record during this time. Their neighbors QPR and Fulham take up the bottom of the table with just 3 points during this time while Fulham have dropped six places in the league table.

This table ranks the 20 Premier League teams by points accumulated over the last 6 games- a span of time which dates back to the first November fixture for each team.

Note: I just realized whoscored.com produces a similar table to the one above with a bit more detail. You can see it here

Monday, December 3, 2012

Tactical Analysis: Newcastle 2-0 Wigan

Maynor Figueroa's 12th minute red card for a last ditch tackle on Papiss Cisse was the key factor in Wigan's 3-0 loss at Newcastle. Ba scored the resulting penalty to put the Magpies up 1-0 and from there they were relatively comfortable for the remainder of the game.

Prior to Figueroa's sending off the game looked like it would provide an interesting tactical battle. When these teams met at the end of April last season, Alan Pardew's side were at a loss for how to defend Roberto Martinez's unconventional 3-4-3 formation and were soundly beaten 4-0. Wigan's 3-4-3 employs two wing backs and two wide forwards. They look to push the wing backs up towards the wide forwards and overload the opposition full back in wide areas (see post below). In the 4-0 defeat Pardew played a 4-3-3 with three central midfielders. Wigan's wing backs (Emmerson Boyce and Jean Beausejour on that day) pushed beyond Newcastle's wide forwards when in possession, creating 2 v. 1 situations with the wide forwards on the flanks in the attacking third. Newcastle's three central midfielders were unable to shift to wider areas and pick up Boyce and Beausejour and Wigan therefore dominated play on the wings.

Given how thoroughly outplayed Pardew's team was in that fixture, it was surprising to see him once again line up in a 4-3-3 for today's game. He must have certainly thought the extra man in the center of the park would allow his side to boss possession down the middle but would have also been concerned the formation would once again give Wigan's wing backs Beausejour and Ronnie Stam space down the wings. To combat this threat Pardew played Jonas Gutierrez fairly deep on the left. The Argentine operated more as a left midfielder than forward and dropped deep to track the runs of Stam when Wigan were in possession. Cisse played narrower and more advanced on the right, looking to get close to Ba. Early on when the game was still 11 v. 11, Wigan looked like they might once again enjoy some success down the left with Cisse failing to track the runs forward of Beausejour.



The red card and resulting penalty changed the entire complexion of the game. In the first few minutes following Figueroa's sending off, Wigan didn't change anything and tried to play a back two of Gary Caldwell and Boyce with Beausejour and Stam continuing on as wing backs in what was effectively a 2-4-3. Martinez was trying to bring on holding midfielder James McArthur for Jordi Gomez but before he could make that sub Ba had added a second after a galloping run forward from Davide Santon whose well struck shot Ali Al-Habsi only parried into the path of Ba.

With the introduction of McArthur, Beausejour was dropped back alongside Caldwell and Boyce to form a back three. David Jones moved to left midfield while McArthur slotted in alongside James McCarthy in the center of midfield. Aroune Kone and Franco di Santo played as forwards in what was now a 3-4-2. Without two wide forwards, Wigan no longer had the ability to create the overloads in wide areas their game is based around. Newcastle had plenty of bodies to deal with any threat down the middle of the field and although Wigan showed some decent passing displays in the second half, the Magpies' goal never really look threatened.


Newcastle certainly enjoyed the extra man in midfield, comfortably controlling possession in that area and at times springing attacks from some excellent dribbling by Sylvain Marveaux. The second half was a rather quiet affair. Pardew's side sat a little deeper and had plenty of bodies in the middle of the field when Wigan tried to cross. Stam and Kone were at times able to work passing combinations and find space to cross down the right but with Di Santo the only target in the box they never really looked like scoring.

Wigan vs. Newcastle: tactics preview

Alan Pardew was given fits last season by Roberto Martinez's 3-4-3 formation in Newcastle's 4-0 defeat to Wigan in late April.

Pardew opted to start the game in a 4-3-3 which meant they defended very narrow in midfield. When in possession, Wigan's wing backs Beausejour and Boyce advanced past Newcastle's wide forwards Ba and Ben Arfa. With Newcastle playing a center midfield three, Beausejour and Boyce were able to drive forward down the wings unmarked from their wing back positions. This left Newcastle's outside backs to defend 1 v 2 on the wings against Wigan's wing backs and outside forwards (Moses and Maloney). Wigan were able to exploit the spare man in wide areas to great effect.
April 28 2012: Wigan 4-0 Newcastle

Pardew has certainly learned from his mistake last season and today will set his team up a 4-4-2 that won't allow Wigan to have a numerical advantage on the wings. The 4-4-2 versus 3-4-3 match up is an interesting one. Both teams will have one extra center back to provide cover (2 Newcastle center backs versus 1 Wigan forward, 3 Wigan center backs versus 2 Newcastle forwards) and be even in the other areas of the pitch.

Today's formations will look something like this, Wigan 3-4-3 (blue) versus Newcastle 4-4-2 (red).