Here's a really fascinating graphic from whoscored.com of the most used formations in Europe's top 5 leagues. Interesting that although 4-2-3-1 is the most used formation in Spain, England, Germany and France, it's only the 11th most used formation in Italy where it has been used only four times. Given Italy's history of catenacio it's unsurprising three man defenses are far more popular there than anywhere else in Europe. Of course, some of the formations are so similar in practice it renders the notations all but meainingless- I'm guessing it's pretty difficult for anyone to distinguish between a 3-5-2, a 3-5-1-1 and a 5-3-2. Nonetheless this is a fun little chart and certainly highlights how fashionable 4-2-3-1 is at the moment.
After Manchester United's relatively successful experimentation with a narrow diamond midfield this season (see Michael Cox analysis of their 3-0 win over Newcastle), Sir Alex Ferguson opted for his more traditional 4-4-1-1 shape against Chelsea with two true wide players in Ashley Young and Antonio Valencia.
His decision to go with width against Chelsea wasn't a particularly difficult one. Ferguson knew full well that his counterpart Roberto Di Matteo would go with the 4-2-3-1 system- with Oscar, Juan Mata and Eden Hazard forming the attacking midfield three- that Chelsea had enjoyed success using in the league this season. Since Chelsea used the formation for the first time in a 2-2 Champions League draw against Juventus, they have employed the same attacking midfield three behind Torres in every Premier League game. Ferguson had plenty of chances to scout the formation and would have had little difficulty recognizing its weaknesses.
Chelsea's 4-2-3-1 formation has two main weakness. The first weakness is its vulnerability to counter attacks (particularly down the flanks). When Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic push forward to help the attack, space opens up in wide areas for the opposition to quickly move into on the break. The second weakness is its tendency to leave Cole and Ivanovic without cover in wide defensive areas. Neither Mata nor Hazard are especially keen defenders. Hazard is particularly guilty of failing to offer defensive cover to his outside backs. Against teams that play with narrower midfields this isn't always a huge problem because John Obi Mikel and Ramires provide cover for the back four in the center of the pitch in their deep lying midfield positions. However, against teams with wingers the problem becomes more apparent. With Mata and Hazard staying high up the pitch, space often opens up for opposition outside backs to advance past them unchecked. When the opposition outside back receives the ball, it leaves Chelsea's own outside back overloaded and forces him to try to defend two players. He's forced to step to ball, leaving the winger unmarked with the time and space to receive the ball and play dangerous crosses into the box.
That United's two early goals came from exploiting these two Chelsea weaknesses suggests Ferguson got his tactics about right. The first goal came when United were able to nick possession in midfield and counter quickly down the right. The second came when United right back Rafael was able to receive the ball behind Hazard, creating a 2 v. 1 advantage with Valencia down the right wing for United. Cole was forced to leave Valencia unmarked and step to Rafael. The Brazilian played a simple ball wide to Valencia who had the time to pick out Van Persie's run in the box (I unfortunately can't embed the video but you can watch the goal on YouTube here). Had Hazard been more diligent in his defensive responsibilities, Rafael would have never received the ball as high up the pitch as he did.
It should be interesting to see how United line up against Arsenal this weekend. Like Chelsea, the Gunners have almost exclusively played a 4-2-3-1 this season and therefore face some of the same defensive problems as Chelsea (although Lucas Podolski and Aaron Ramsey seem to do a slightly better job of protecting their outside backs than Mata and Hazard). Will Ferguson once again opt for a 4-4-1-1 and try to exploit space on the wings? Since Arsenal have been forced to play Andre Santos at left back for the injured Kieran Gibbs, they have looked very vulnerable to attacks down the opponent's right side. It would be surprising if Ferguson didn't again opt for a right winger to exploit the shaky Santos.
Chelsea's and Arsenal's continued use of a 4-2-3-1 indicates the players are comfortable in that system and with each game they play in that system they'll continue to develop a better understanding of one another and become more fluid. However, it also makes them predictable for clever, adaptable managers like Ferguson who are happy to play reactive football. The Scotsman is comfortable playing any number of different formations and styles based on the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent. More often than not, when he knows how the opposition is going to set out to play, he can implement a strategy that gives United a very good chance of winning games. I'm not suggesting Arsenal and Chelsea should alter their formations from time to time in the same manner as Ferguson. Playing Ferguson's more reactive style has its own draw backs, mainly that by adapting your formation to your opponent you aren't able to develop a fluid, consistent system of your own and sometimes even managers with the pedigree of SAF simply get the tactics wrong. United's 1-0 defeat to City at the end of last season that effectively handed the league title over to City is a good example. Ferguson set out with Park Ji Sung as the most advanced midfielder behind Rooney in a 4-5-1 in a set up designed to attack on the counter. Park was forced to track Yaya Toure's runs forward, leaving Rooney isolated up top. United rarely threatened after going a goal behind. However, more reactive managers do have the distinct advantage of arranging their teams to mitigate the most dangerous elements of an opponents system and exploit the weakest ones.
It should also be mentioned that Ferguson's tactics against Chelsea were hardly flawless. After going up 2-0, Chelsea were much the better side until being reduced to 10 (then 9) men. During this stretch of the game Chelsea out passed United 220 to 156 and United were continually troubled by Chelsea's numerical superiority in the center of midfield. Perhaps Ferguson would have been wise to replace Young with someone like Anderson who would have allowed United to better compete in the center of midfield after going up by two goals.
Update: I added another observation so it's now five observations rather than four.
Coming into Arsenal’s London derby with
Queens Park Rangers, Arsenal had suffered a league loss to a then winless
Norwich City followed by a defeat to Champions League foe Schalke 04 at the
Emirates — the club’s first home loss in
the group stage of that competition in 9 years. Arsenal’s 1-0 victory at the
Emirates over a winless, 10-man QPR side that currently sits at the bottom of
the Premier League table was hardly the emphatic victory that Arsène Wenger needed
to quell the frustrations of Arsenal supporters. Arsenal’s lone goal came from a Mikel Arteta
tap-in after the ball bounced around QPR’s goalmouth. Replays indicate that
Arteta was unambiguously in an offside position; Mark Hughes and Queens Park
Rangers are rightfully upset with the decision.
(1) Arsenal
continue to struggle to create scoring chances. The Gunners had 12 shots 5
of which were on target in the first 70 minutes of the game, but few of these attempts
were genuine scoring chances. Other than a Ramsey header off the woodwork from
a Bacary Sagna cross inside of 10 minutes and a Per Mertesacker header from an
Arteta free kick at the beginning of the second half, Arsenal seldom created
scoring opportunities until the final 20 minutes of the game.
(2) Arsenal
created several scoring chances in the final period of the game, but they did
not take their chances. Wenger brought on Walcott for Wilshere in the 67th minute,
Gervinho for Podolski in the 71st minute, and Arshavin for Gervinho in the 82nd
minute after a Gervinho injury. The insertions of Walcott and Gervinho/Arshavin
gave Arsenal more width and seemed to give impetus to the attack. In the 76th minute, the ball bounced out to a wide open
Santi Cazorla a mere 15 yards from goal, but Cazorla —
probably Arsenal’s most competent finisher with his feet — skyed his shot
far over the goal. Soon after, Thomas Vermaelen fouled Stéphane Mbia who
then kicked at Vermaelen from ground. Anthony Taylor’s decision to show a
straight red card was uncontroversial. With their width and a man advantage, Arsenal
managed 8 shots, 4 of which were on target, from the 80th minute onwards. Despite
several good chances, Arsenal’s only goal came from an offside Mikel Arteta. Prior to Arteta’s involvement in the play,
Olivier Giroud couldn't head a pinpoint perfect cross from Andrey Arshavin past Júlio César who made a number of fine saves in the final period.
(3) Arsenal were fortunate to close out the final minutes of the game after Arteta's winner in the 84th minute. Even with a man advantage and only 6 minutes remaining in regulation time, Arsenal allowed QPR two promising scoring chances: Esteban Granero was in on goal in the 89th but pulled his shot wide, and Jamie Mackey had an even better opportunity in extra time that Vito Mannone did well to block. With such little time remaining, a man advantage, and a squad that prides itself on its ability to play a possession-based system, Wenger is likely furious that his side nearly dropped points from this fixture.
(4) Jack
Wilshere was impressive in his return to Arsenal’s lineup. Wilshere, who
had not made a Premier League appearance since May of 2011 after a prolonged
recovery from injury, rarely put a foot wrong in the 66 minutes he played. He
impressively completed 44 of 47 total passes (94 percent) and 21 of 22 passes
in the attacking third (95 percent), he successfully completed 4 out of 5
take-ons, he created one chance, and he had a shot on target.
(5) It
is unclear if Wilshere and Arteta have the complementary skill sets necessary to
form an effective midfield partnership. Wilshere was an essential component
of the Arsenal midfield in the 2010-11 season, and Arteta served a similar role
in the midfield in the 2011-12 season. QPR’s visit to the Emirates marked the
first instance in which the two have played in Arsenal’s midfield together. During
the game, Wilshere and Arteta almost ran into each other on a couple of
occasions. At times, Wilshere seemed to sit beside Arteta in a deeper midfield
role rather than play a box-to-box role. Looking at the figure below that displays
Wilshere’s passing, it is evident that he sprinkled passes from side to side.
Arteta’s passing often serves a similar purpose (see, for example, his passing
vs. West Ham). Arsenal have arguably looked most dangerous this season with Arteta
and Abou Diaby in the lineup. Diaby’s style of play is generally more vertical,
and his driving runs help link up the midfield with the attacking players. It
would, of course, be rash to pass judgment on a midfield partnership that has
existed for all of 67 minutes. I suspect as they play together more and as
Wilshere improves his fitness levels, their partnership will improve. But,
given the myriad of options in the midfield that Wenger has at his disposal,
especially as players like Diaby and Tomáš Rosický return from injury, Wenger will need to seriously consider the most
effective combination of midfielders rather than the best individual
midfielders available for selection.
In February, Dan wrote two excellent pieces explaining the net passing statistic and how the relationship between net passing and goal difference for an individual team can shine light on the importance that team places on dominating possession (we prefer using the net passing metric over possession percentage because it is more fine grained). Net passing is simply the number of passes a team completes over the course of a game less the number their opponent completes. If team B completes more passes in a game than than team A, team A's net passing for the game is negative.
For teams whose tactics are largely centered around ball retention and patient buildup play we expect a strong positive relationship between net passing and goal difference. In other words, as net passing increases for these teams we would expect to see goal difference increase positively.
For teams who prefer to play primarily on the counter, outpossessing the opponent is unimportant. Counterattacking teams want their opponent to have possession and to commit numbers forward so they can break quickly while the opposition is out of position. Counterattacks require fewer passes than slow buildup play from the back. Therefore, for primarily counterattacking teams, we expect no discernible relationship between net passing and goal difference.
Of course, many top level sides use both counterattacking and possession styles based on factors like the style of play of the opposition and whether the game is played at a club's home stadium or an away ground. For instance, we'd expect Manchester United to boss possession in a league game against Stoke at Old Trafford and have a positive net passing value (which they did last Saturday). However, in a Champions League game against Barcelona at the Nou Camp, we'd expect them to keep a compact defensive shape, allow Barca to have the bulk of possession and then look to quickly counter and therefore have a negative net passing value. For these sides, we'd expect a weaker relationship between net passing and goal difference.
Premier League Net Passing 2012-2013
The bar chart below shows the average net passing for each of the Premier League's 20 teams after eight games (Reading and Sunderland have played only seven games). Teams are listed from left to right according to their position in the league table (Chelsea currently sit atop the table while QPR are last). Manchester City, a side with very technical players capable of short intricate passes, have the highest net passing value. They are outpassing their opponents by an average of 231 passes per game. Stoke City, a team that focuses more on physical strength and territory than possession, have the lowest net passing value. They are being outpassed by an average of 226 passes per game.
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I'm also including this graph of passes completed per game for anyone interested.
Click to Enlarge
Net Passing and League Standing Relationship
While Dan looked at the relationship between net passing and points per game for individual teams, I wanted to look at the relationship between net passing and league standing for all 20 Premier League teams to determine the explanatory power of net passing on league position. If we believed that net passing was the only factor that determined whether a team won or lost a game, we'd expect the team with the highest net passing value to be in first place in the league and the team with the lowest net passing value to be in last. The bars in the net passing bar graph above would get progressively shorter as we moved right from the first place team to the last.
Clearly this is not the case. Manchester City have the highest net passing value yet they are only third in the league. QPR have a positive net passing value but are in last place. Liverpool have the fourth highest net passing value in the league but are still in the bottom half of the table while West Brom and West Ham are 6th and 7th respectively despite having substantial negative net passing values.
The graph shows what we're all well aware of- there are more factors that determine the winner of a soccer game than simply who passes the ball more. For example, in Manchester United's two defeats this season to Everton and Tottenham they outpassed their rivals by 818 passes. Arsenal completed 414 more passes than Norwich last Saturday but were beaten 1-0. Teams have to convert possession into goal scoring opportunities and then have to finish those opportunities. For a number of reasons, it often makes sense for certain teams to employ tactics that aren't focused on ball retention and allow the opposition to control the bulk of possession- it doesn't necessarily mean these teams will finish in the bottom of the league because they have a low net passing value.
The bar graph is interesting however in that it shows of the ten teams that have positive net passing values, seven of them are in the top half of the table. Of the ten with negative net passing values, seven are in the bottom half of the table. That there are more teams with positive net passing values in the top half of the league suggests there may be a relationship between net passing and league position.
To determine exactly what the explanatory power of net passing on league position is, I plotted league position versus net passing for each of the 20 Premier League teams below. Teams higher up on the y axis are in the bottom half of the league standings and teams further to the left on the x axis have higher negative net passing values. If we believe that higher net passing values improve a team's league standing, we'd expect our trend line to slope down and to the right (indicating that as net passing increases, league position gets closer to first place). Indeed, the trend line is negative. The r^2 value of 0.229 tells us that net passing explains about 23% of the variation in league standing. So although net passing clearly isn't the only factor that determines the winner of a game, it does seem to play a part in determining league position.
Click to Enlarge
The negative slope makes sense. Controlling possession and outpassing your opponent requires a team to have players that are technically gifted (good control and passing ability). Having a lot of technically gifted players also makes a team more likely to win games. Manchester United will always boss possession against a team like Stoke because their players are more technically talented and more often than not they'll beat Stoke because they have superior talent. Because of the superior talent required to play a possession game, it makes sense that top teams also generally have high net passing values.
The analysis however does not determine the subtle difference of whether top teams are top teams because they dominate passing or whether they dominate passing because they are top teams (for a team like Arsenal with a strong emphasis on ball retention regardless of the opponent my guess is the former, for a more tactically more flexible team like Manchester United I'd guess the latter).
Sample Size Issues
The significance of this analysis is limited by the small number of games played in the Premier League thus far. Eighteen teams have played only eight games and two have played only seven. Teams have also not played the same schedules as one another which will also influence net passing and league position. For example, West Ham has only played three games against teams currently in the top half of the table (and lost two) while seven of QPR's eight games have been against teams in the top half. Would QPR and West Ham's net passing and league position look different if their schedules had been swapped? More than likely they would. It would be interesting to do this analysis for the whole of last season. A project for the future perhaps.
Shakhtar Donetsk threatened Chelsea with swift counterattacks all evening as the Ukranian side dominated play in a 2-1 Champions League win. The win puts the Ukrainian side 3 points clear of Chelsea at the top of group E and puts a great deal of pressure on the Blues to win the return home fixture in a fortnight if they're to qualify for the knockout stages.
Both teams lined up in 4-2-3-1 formations. Frank Lampard was given the start alongside John Obi Mikel as a deep lying midfielder. Ramires shuffled to the right attacking midfield position, presumably to provide defensive help to Branislav Ivanovic on the excellent Willain, while Eden Hazard started the game on the bench. There were no surprises in Mircea Lucescu's starting 11.
Lampard picked up an injury 18 minutes in and was replaced by Hazard. Ramires dropped back to Lampard's position in the center of midfield and Hazard played on the right, the lineup Chelsea have used most of this season.
For the second consecutive game Chelsea were vulnerable on the counter. While Chelsea were fortunate that Moussa Dembele and Gareth Bale were out of Spurs' lineup in their 4-2 win at the weekend, they still at times appeared susceptible to quick counters when they lost possession in what was a rather open game. The problem was even more pronounced last night as Willian, Alex Teixeira and Henrik Mkhitaryan were able to get in space behind Mikel, Ramires and outside backs Ivanovic and Cole on the break and run at the center backs.
The space that opens up between Chelsea's two holding midfielders and center backs has been an issue all season. When Mikel is forced to push into a more advanced position to offer a passing option for the front four, the center backs have stayed rather deep creating a big pocket of empty space. When Chelsea lose possession, the opposition has been able to play quick outlet passes to teammates moving into that space, setting off dangerous counters. As they showed last season under Villas-Boas, Chelsea are not comfortable squeezing the space the opposition has to play in when possession is lost by pushing the defensive line forward and pressing (like Barcelona). Instead, their defense tends to drop deeper when they lose the ball.
This is understandable. John Terry's lack of pace makes him vulnerable to balls in behind him when he presses forward and Chelsea's experimentation with a high line last season was disastrous (the 5-3 Arsenal loss the clearest example). But because Mata, Hazard and Oscar are typically not quick to make defensive recovery runs, loads of space opens up in the middle third of the pitch for their opponents to move into- this explains why Chelsea's last two games have been so open. The issue is, effectively, that the back six and front four have been rather disjointed defensively. While this shape has given Chelsea's three advanced midfielders the freedom to focus more on creating scoring opportunities than worrying about defensive responsibilities, it has made them a less compact side defensively.
The new, more fluid attacking system has produced some breathtaking displays thus far and few Chelsea supporters will be calling for a return to the defensive tactics that won them the Champions League last season. However, they'll likely continue to look vulnerable on the break as they adjust to the new system.
Andre Villas-Boas and Roberto Di Matteo will lead their respective clubs out to a lunchtime kickoff at White Hart Lane tomorrow. There are plenty of sub plots in this one. Villas-Boas was of course sacked by Chelsea in March, paving the way for Di Matteo to lead the club to a historic FA Cup-Champions League double. That Champions League title sent Spurs crashing out of a qualification spot for this season's installment of the tournament despite finishing fourth in the league- two places above Chelsea. In April, Chelsea handily beat Spurs 5-1 in an FA Cup semifinal. However, Spurs contend a wrongfully allowed Juan Mata goal that made the score 3-1 was the turning point in that contest. Perhaps most importantly, this game showcases the Premier League's two most sartorially inclined managers in a battle over the better wearer of impeccably tailored suits.
Both sides are playing decent soccer at the moment. After a rocky opening three games to the season, Spurs have won four straight including the club's first away win at Old Trafford since 1989. A 0-0 draw at QPR is the only blemish on Chelsea's record as they sit four points clear at the top of the Premier League table.
Same Formation, Different Styles
Both sides are likely to line up in 4-2-3-1 formations though the different attributes of the two teams' sets of players mean they'll play it with very different styles. Chelsea's three attacking midfielders, Oscar, Hazard and Mata, are clever and technically gifted players who look to get in pockets of space between the seams and play intricate passing combinations with one another. Mata and Hazard will frequently switch sides and both will drift in field and occupy more central areas. Chelsea will likely look to attack patiently and use their tight control and quick passing to create gaps to get the ball in behind the Tottenham defense. Expect Ramires to play over Lampard to give Chelsea more athleticism in the middle of the park to match the athleticism of Sandro and Dembele.
Spurs attacking midfield three doesn't have the same technical quality as that of their counterparts but they have incredible pace and athleticism. Lennon and Bale will look to get the ball wide into the channels and get behind Chelsea's outside backs. Dempsey isn't a typical center attacking midfielder that links defense to offense- he doesn't have that type of passing vision- however Spurs will mainly transition from defense to offense through either Lennon and Bale or through Dembele's powerful runs forward from a deeper position. Dempsey's ability to make well timed runs and finish off chances will make him a threat for balls into the box from Lennon and Bale.
Tottenham wingers vs. Chelsea outside backs
Two of the most important individual battles will be fought in wide areas between Chelsea's outside backs and Tottenham's wingers. The contest between Ivanovic and Bale will pose a particularly difficult tactical question for Di Matteo, specifically how brave he wants Ivanovic to be with his positioning going forward. With Mata and Hazard frequently tucking inside higher up the pitch, Chelsea like to get width from their outside backs in the attacking end of the field. However, when Ivanovic pushes forward it will be open space for Spurs to counter into with Bale. The last thing Chelsea want is Bale running at full pace at their center backs. His goal against Manchester United (at 0:25 in the video below) shows just how dangerous he is when he's able to get the ball behind the opposition right back (Rafael on that day) and run with a head of steam at center backs. Lennon's pace could also be dangerous on the right, though Ashley Cole is quicker and a better defender than Ivanovic so should be more equipped to deal with Lennon's bursts forward.
Chelsea's Tempo
Chelsea will likely hope to control the tempo of this game and keep it played at a relatively slow pace. Spurs are far more athletic and powerful than they are creative and therefore a more open game will suit them better than it will Chelsea. Expect Chelsea to keep things compact at the back, defending fairly deep with two banks of four. With the likes of Dembele, Lennon, Bale, Dempsey and Defoe, Tottenham are far more dangerous when they have the space to turn and run at defenders than when they have to circulate the ball quickly with passes to unlock crowded defenses. Against a tight defense, Tottenham don't have the type of players that are as clever with their movement and creative with their passes as Chelsea. Given this is an away game for Chelsea, they'll be particularly keen not to allow this one to open up and rile up Spurs fans.
Conclusion
This game will largely come down to which team can impose its style on the game early. If Spurs can turn this into an open game, their pacey attackers and athleticism will give them the advantage. If Chelsea can control the tempo and allow their four most advanced players to use their clever movement and superior technique going forward, they'll have the advantage.
Shortly after the melee that ensued after the final whistle of England's 1-0 European
Championship win over Serbia, video surfaced on YouTube of Serbian supporters audibly directing monkey chants towards England's Danny Rose (below).
Rose, understandably, reacted angrily to the racist chants and kicked a
ball into the crowd, an action that would earn him a second yellow. He has since said that the racist chanting had gone on
all game and that he was twice hit by stones thrown from the Krusevac
crowd, claims captain Jordan Henderson has since confirmed.
The behavior from the Serbian supporters was disgraceful but hardly surprising for a nation with a well documented history of racially motivated taunts and violent behavior at football matches. In 2003
Serbian ultras directed racial abuse at black Wales players. In 2007
black England U-21 international Nedum Onuoha was the victim of racist chanting. In a Euro 2012 qualifier in Genoa last year, the referee was
forced to abandon the game after Serbian ultras clashed with police and
threw flares on the field. All of these incidents were met with farcically weak punishments from UEFA. At best the Serbian FA has shown
an inability to deal with racism and crowd violence. At worst,
they've shown an unwillingness to do so. Their behavior in the aftermath
of yesterday's incident suggests the latter.
"FA of Serbia absolutely refuses and denies that there were any
occurrences of racism before and during the match at the stadium in
Kruševac. Making connection between the seen incident - a fight
between members of the two teams - and racism has absolutely no ground
and we consider it to be a total malevolence."
With regards to Rose the statement said,
"Unfortunately, after the fourth minute of the additional time and the
victory goal scored by the guest team, unpleasant scenes were seen at
the pitch. And while most of the English team players celebrated the
score, their player number 3, Danny Rose, behaved in inappropriate,
unsportsmanlike and vulgar manner towards the supporters on the stands
at the stadium in Kruševac, and for that he was shown a red card.
Unfortunately, it would turn out that was the moment the incident, that
later developed, had started."
This official statement
from the Serbian FA casts at least as big a shadow on Serbian football
as the behavior of its fans in Krusevac. Rose was guilty of nothing more
than representing his country as a black person. For the Serbian FA
to deny the claims of racial abuse when evidence proves it happened and
to somehow blame the victim of that abuse for the violent scenes is disgraceful. It shows they have no interest in cleaning up their act and that their FA is in fact complicit in the unsavory fan behavior. By denying there was any racism shown Tuesday evening, their FA is effectively saying to Serbian fans, "do what you please, we'll deny any claims against you rather than try to stop your behavior."
UEFA has to ban Serbia from all international competition for an extended period of time.
The safety of black players should be the main focus of UEFA when they
look into this incident. How can UEFA conscionably send a black
footballer to play in an environment that clearly isn't a safe one for
him? As long as Serbia continues to create an intimidating environment
inside their stadiums, and continues to make no effort to change, they don't deserve the right to play in any
international tournaments at any level.
UEFA president Michel Platini warned Serbia in February of last year that if they didn't control their fans they'd face expulsion from future club and international tournaments. Serbia has clearly failed on that front. If Platini fails to follow through on his warning, FIFA and UEFA will lose the tiny amount of credibility they have left.
While condemnation of
the Serbian supporters' behavior has been nearly universal, a few folks
in the British media were displeased with Rose's reaction to the racial
abuse. Former professional footballer Paul Parker, himself a victim of
racial abuse during his playing days in England, suggested Rose should have kept his dignity, walked down the tunnel and "saved his complaint for the official channels." But what have the official channels, ie
UEFA, done to combat the problem of racism? On more than one occasion
the behavior of certain Serbian fans has disgraced the sport yet UEFA
continues to give them slaps on the wrist as punishment in the form of trivial fines and one match stadium bans. If
black players continue to simply walk down the tunnel when they've been
racially abused as though nothing has happened, as Parker suggests, the
official channels will be all too happy to sweep the incidents under the
rug and move on as though nothing did in fact happen. Roses's reaction raised the profile of this event around the world. People are demanding UEFA, for once, react strongly to the disreputable and dangerous behavior of Serbian fans. Contrary to
what Parker suggests, Rose acted with an incredible amount of dignity-
he stood up to intolerant, unacceptable behavior despite the threat of
violence from Serbian players and fans. It's time for UEFA to do the same.
This was a game of two halves with Spain controlling the first with patient buildup play and France dominating the second on the counter.
France defended very deep in the first half with a bank of five in midfield in front of the back four. Only Benzema stayed behind the ball. The deep defensive line allowed Spain's midfield to comfortably dictate the tempo of the game. Very little pressure was put on Xavi and Xabi Alonso in deeper areas. Fabregas, Cazorla and Iniesta all looked to get in space between France's midfield and back four and combined for some tidy interchanges in these areas. Spain caused France the most trouble when they were able to get in between the seams, turn and face the back four, and slide balls in behind the back four.
France should have taken a lesson from Portugal manager Paulo Bento's excellent tactical set up against Spain in the Euros. Bento played his midfielders higher up the pitch and pressed Xabi Alonso and Xavi when they got in possession around the midfield line. This broke up Spain's rhythm and halted service into their more advanced playmakers. The plan was to win possession back higher up the field and then quickly counter through Nani and Ronaldo on the wings. Although Ronaldo missed a decent chance and Portugal never got the goal they needed, the plan frustrated Spain into playing more long passes than they would have liked and the game ultimately ended 0-0.
By playing such a deep line, France gave Spain's deeper lying players the opportunity to pick their heads up and find a penetrating pass forward. Xavi and Xabi Alonso are brilliant passers more than capable of threading a decisive ball through tight areas. France were clearly looking to counter when they did win the ball back. However, with the defense sitting so deep and inviting pressure, when they did win back possession it was in and around their own 18. Spain were able to press immediately, denying France a decent outlet pass and forcing them to launch hopeful long balls for Benzema that Spain were comfortably able to win back. They needed to win the ball back higher up the field to spark quick counters.
In the second half France finally started pressing the Spanish midfield higher up the pitch, unsettling the rhythm they had been able to establish in the first half. Deschamps replaced Menez and Gonalons with more combative midfielders Moussa Sissoko and Blaise Matuidi. Both were outstanding, continuously nicking possession from Spain in midfield and spring dangerous counter attacks, mainly through Valbuena, Ribery and Benzema. They looked excellent on the counter, creating several dangerous scoring opportunities only to be spoiled by some wasteful finishing. The breakthrough finally came in the last minute of stoppage time when Juanfran inexplicably gave the ball way in midfield, allowing one final France counter forward. Matuidi picked the ball off Juanfran and released Ribery down the left. He crossed in for second half substitute Olivier Giroud who made no mistake, heading in on the last play of the game. France were deservedly rewarded for their adventurous play in the second half.
Daniel rightfully pointed out that my previous post gave far too much credit to Jurgen Klinsmann for making what any professional soccer coach would have realized was a necessary move away from Bob Bradley's 4-4-2 and introducing three-man central midfield formations. During Bradley's tenure, it became rather obvious his favored 4-4-2 was allowing the opposition too much space in the center of the park- Klinsmann can hardly be considered a brilliant tactician simply for recognizing that fact. While his tactical shifts have created a more solid spine down the center of the field, the US continues to struggle to translate midfield dominance into genuine goal scoring opportunities. A 92nd minute goal from Eddie Johnson against Antigua & Barbuda spared Klinsmann the blushes of what would have been one of the most humiliating defeats in the team's history but signaled the team has to improve quickly if they want to avoid a nervous final phase of qualification.
Some of the US's offensive difficulties can reasonably be blamed on the challenges that accompany playing CONCACAF opposition on the road- playing on dreadful pitches in front of hostile crowds is no easy task (although it would be quite a stretch to say the 8,000 fans that attended Sir Vivian Richards Stadium Friday created an intimidating atmosphere), particularly in torrential weather when the opposition defends with all 10 men in their own defensive third. However, it's still deeply concerning that the US has had such a
difficult time converting dominant possession figures into genuine goal
scoring opportunities against vastly inferior opposition. Despite
holding 72% possession Friday against Antigua & Barbuda, the US could only muster
four shots on target. The frightening truth is that the US has not
looked good on the road once in this phase of qualifying. In fact, you
could reasonably argue the first half of the 1-0 home win over Jamaica
was the only decent half we've played thus far.
One
good half out of ten played does not bode well for the team in the
final hexagonal phase of qualification, assuming the US get a result
over Guatemala tonight and qualify. Based on current standings, the
hexagonal would consist of Guatemala, USA, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama
and Canada. With the possible exception of Canada, those are all very
difficult places to play. Given current form, it doesn't seem
inconceivable that the US could struggle to finish in the top three and
secure automatic qualification.
How responsible Klinsmann is for the recent run of unconvincing performances is difficult to say. While he can take credit for the fact his controversial roster inclusions of Alan Gordon and Eddie Johnson proved to be a difference maker against A&B, legitimate questions should be raised about how the US put themselves in a position where they needed a last minute winner in the first place. This phase of qualifying was expected to be a cakewalk for the Americans and it probably should have been. That they've left themselves with work still to do in the final game against Guatemala to ensure passage to the next stage suggests the US may not be adjusting to Klinsmann as quickly as had been hoped. We knew from the outset Klinsmann wanted to introduce a patient, possession-based system and has done so. But while his style has certainly allowed the US to dominate possession, too much of that possession occurs in the middle third of the field. As we move the ball into the attacking third we often lack the technical ability and inventiveness required to unlock compact defenses. Throughout the field, the ball moves from player to player too slowly, allowing defenses to easily shift and retain their proper shape. There's a sneaking suspicion that Klinsmann's ambition for how he wants the team to play does not much the technical ability of the players at his disposal. While I applaud his ambition of bringing a more modern brand of football to the USMNT, his job is, first and foremost, to qualify for the World Cup. Qualifiers are not the time to be dogmatic about your ideals, sometimes pragmatism is necessary.
This isn't to say Klinsmann is doomed to fail. The world
of international football has its examples of teams that have
struggled in the buildup to major tournaments but gone on to achieve
great things. Carlos Bilardo won only three of his first 15 games in
charge of Argentina and only one of seven in the buildup to the 1986
World Cup. Argentina would go on to win that tournament. The US is obviously less talented than Argentina and no one is expecting them to win the World Cup in Brazil
but the point is that Klinsmann will ultimately be judged on how
he performs at the World Cup if the US qualify, not on how convincing
they were in qualification. Poor performances in qualifiers and
friendlies would be quickly forgotten if Klinsmann can get the team into
the knockout stages in Brazil. The challenges of playing in a World Cup are very different than those of a CONCACAF qualifying campaign and may actually better suit Klinsmann's style of play. Pitches will certainly be wider than 70 yards so there will be better opportunities to stretch defenses laterally and play with more width. Few if any teams will be frightened enough of the US to defend with nine men in the defensive third so there should be more opportunities to get in dangerous pockets of space in and around the 18 and more opportunities to counter. Opponents will be more talented but will also open themselves up. This should allow the US to rely less on technique and clever passing-which they've been forced to do against compact CONCACAF defenses and isn't the strongest aspect of the American's game- and more on athleticism.
Getting ahead of myself though. Let's get a result tonight first.
The jury still seems to be out on whether the USA are showing enough signs of progress under Jurgen Klinsmann to suggest the 48-year-old German is the man to lead the team to a successful 2014 World Cup run. Historic away wins under Klinsmann over Mexico and Italy hint at a team on the rise, yet a puzzling loss to Jamaica in a World Cup qualifier in July, controversial roster selections and an underwhelming goal-scoring record have raised doubts among some American supporters about his ability to effectively manage the national team.
A number of the concerns surrounding Klinsmann's first year and a half on the job are reasonable. Four losses from his opening six games wasn't the impression he would have expected to make. The US have not packed enough of a punch in front of goal. In Klinsmann's 18 games in charge, they have scored more than one goal only three times and have averaged just 1.17 goals per game. He got his tactics wrong in the 2-1 loss to Jamaica, putting the US in a precarious position in World Cup qualification. We voiced our frustration on this blog about his decision in that game to leave Clint Dempsey high up the field just behind forwards Jozy Altidore and Herculez Gomez, leaving the three man midfield of Kyle Beckerman, Jermaine Jones, and Maurice Edu stretched to cover the width of the pitch against a Jamaica side playing with two wingers. His most recent decision to leave Altidore off the roster for the upcoming qualifiers and his hesitation to select Michael Bradley to the squad early in his reign raised questions about his team selection.
However, despite what many see as a disappointing first 15 months on the job, it's important to consider the type of soccer the national team was playing prior to Klinsmann's arrival and how it has changed since. Under Bob Bradley the US were an undisciplined side tactically, particularly defensively. From January 2010 until he was sacked in July 2011, Bradley's team played nine teams ranked in the top 30 of the FIFA World Rankings. They drew three of those and lost the other six. In those nine games, they conceded an average of 2.2 goals per game. Klinsmann has faced seven sides ranked in the top 30 and won 2, drawn 1 and lost 3. During those games, the US have conceded 1.2 goals per game, a full goal improvement over Bradley. The US are nowhere close to being able to match the technique of Europe and South America's best sides. In order for the US to compete with them they need to be organized and have great defensive shape. Klinsmann's biggest contribution the national team thus far has been to improve that defensive shape by introducing more modern formations, specifically formations that use a three-man central midfield and provide more adequate cover for the back four.
Bradley's default formation was either a traditional 4-4-2 (I use traditional to mean a 4-4-2 with two center midfielders and two wide midfielders) or a 4-4-1-1 with a withdrawn forward behind a #9 striker. Both of these systems use only two center midfielders, and typically Bradley would play one of either Maurice Edu, Ricardo Clark, or Jose Torres alongside his son Michael. Played well, 4-4-1-1s and 4-4-2s can be fine formations, and there were games throughout Bradley's tenure where the US looked strong playing them. However, he showed an inability to change these formations and move to ones with three-man center midfields when the tactics of the opposition dictated that he should have.
One of the biggest problems that can arise defensively for a team using a 4-4-2 is the gap of space that often opens up between the two center midfielders and the back four. In a 4-4-2 the center midfielders are responsible for getting tight on the opposition center midfielders. If they're forced to push high up the field to do this, it can create dangerous pockets of space in front of the back four for opposition attackers to move in to. Opponents who receive the ball in these areas have time to turn and dribble at the back four. This forces the center backs to make a decision to either contain the dribbler and continue to back up or to step out and try to win a tackle. If they continue to contain they run the risk of allowing the man in possession to get into a dangerous shooting position. But if one center back steps it allows the opposition to play dangerous through balls into the space left vacated by the stepping center back. I've labeled this gap "problem area" in the diagram below. One way to minimize these gaps between center mids and center backs is to push the back four high up the field towards the center midfielders. However, holding a high defensive line comes with its own risks. High lines are susceptible to balls over the top or slipped in behind the back four, particularly when your center backs lack pace to keep up with opposition forwards. They also require an intelligent back four that knows when to collectively step forward to put the opposition offsides. With high defensive lines, the problem area therefore tends to become the space between the back four and goalkeeper.
The USA's performance at the 2010 World Cup offered a perfect illustration of a 4-4-2's defensive shortcomings in the center of the pitch. The US played a 4-4-2 in every game with Jozy Altidore paired with either Herculez Gomez or Robbie Findley at forward, Bradley in the center of midfield alongside either Edu, Torres, or Clark and Landon Donovan and Clint Dempsey occupying the wide areas. All three goals the US conceded in group play resulted from an opposition player making a dangerous run into the gap between the back four and midfield, leaving the US defense out of position. In the opening game against England, Wayne Rooney dropped back from his forward position into this gap (video below). Not wanting to allow the dangerous Rooney to get the ball in this space and turn, center back Oguchi Onyewu felt the need to step out of his position in the back four and track Rooney. This opened up a huge amount of space between the US's other center back, Jay DeMerit, and left back Carlos Bocanegra for an England player to burst into, something Steven Gerrard was all too happy to do. Rooney never touched the ball but his incisive movement had done the damage. Lampard's pass found its way to Emile Heskey who laid it through for Gerrard to comfortably tuck home. Clark, Bradley's partner in central midfield that day, often gets blamed for the goal and indeed he failed to track the run of Gerrard. However, the defensive system was more to blame than Clark. As a center midfielder you're used to passing off forward runs to your center backs. He did a poor job of reading the situation, but the gap in defense should have never opened up. Even if he'd tracked Gerrard from the outset, the England midfielder still may have beat him in a foot race into the space.
England were also lined up in a 4-4-2 that day. Had Bradley gone with three central midfielders, the US would have had a spare man in the center of the park to sit just in front of the back four. That would have allowed Onyewu to pass Rooney off to the spare midfielder rather than getting himself out of position by tracking him. The gap would have never opened up for Rooney to run into, and that goal would likely have never happened.
In the US's second game against Slovenia, Clark was replaced with Torres but the US kept it's 4-4-2 shape. Again, they were made to pay for allowing the opposition to get into pockets of space between DeMerit and Onyewu at center back and Bradley and Torres in the middle of the pitch. In the video below (at 1:09), Valter Birsa drifts unmarked into a 20-yard gap in front of the back four. He receives the ball, turns and shoots before DeMerit or Onyewu are able to step. His finish was incredible, but the amount of space he was given to drift into was criminal and a product of the US's flat, four-man midfield.
Slovenia's second goal again came from an opposition player drifting into the problem gap. Forward Milivoje Novakovic drifts away from the US center backs to receive the ball in the gap where he can turn and slip it through for his forward partner Ljubijankic. The bulk of the blame for this goal, however, falls on Onyewu for his woeful positioning. The other three defenders had done their job pushing forward to close the gap and make the defense more compact. Onyewu was likely positioned so deep because he was worried about his lack of pace being exposed with a ball played in behind him. He wanted to keep Ljubikankic in front of him rather than on his shoulder.
Less than a year on from the World Cup, Bradley hadn't learned his lesson. In a friendly with Spain, he fielded a 4-4-2 against a Spanish side lined up in a 4-3-3 with a world class central midfield trio of Sergio Busquets, Xabi Alonso, and Santi Cazorla. Outmanned in the midfield, the US were subsequently picked apart 4-0. That two of the four goals were scored by Cazorla, an attacking midfielder who makes a living finding pockets of space between defense and midfield, is no surprise.
The obvious key defensive feature of three-man central midfields is that they provide an extra layer of defensive depth in midfield. The extra midfielder can fill the most dangerous areas of space in front of the back four. Incredibly, even after the World Cup and the battering from Spain, Bradley refused to accept his side was often being overrun in midfield. In the end it would cost him his job as he again fielded a 4-4-2 against Mexico in the Gold Cup final. El Tri's first and third goals came from players receiving the ball unmarked in gaps in the middle of the field. (You can see the goals here at 2:30 and 4:28.)
Klinsmann would have certainly recognized the reasons behind the US's rather porous defense under Bradley. He has experimented with a number of different formations, 4-4-2 included, and has said he picks his formations based on the strengths of the players he has available and the style of play of the opposition. In other words, he is flexible and likes his teams to be able to play a number of different styles. But one feature that has been fairly consistent in Klinsmann's lineups is a three-man central midfield. Whether a 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1 or diamond 4-4-2, he has shown that he likes to have one center midfielder available to sit in gaps just in front of the back four to prevent the opposition from receiving the ball in these dangerous areas. It has worked to shore up the defense. The US have conceded more than one goal in only three games under Klinsmann. Of the four goals conceded in this World Cup qualifying round, three have come from free kicks. The difficulty the US have had creating genuine goal-scoring opportunities against weaker CONCACAF opposition has been frustrating, but that phase of the game will come as players like Landon Donovan recover from injury.
Jurgen Klinsmann has made the US a more sophisticated side to match up against, and that will have its benefits in the long run.
In Newcastle's 3-0 defeat to Manchester United this weekend, Alan Pardew opted for a 4-4-2 with Papiss Cisse and Demba Ba paired at center forward, Cheick Tiote and Yohan Cabaye in the center of midfield, Jonas Guitierrez at left midfield and Hatem Ben Arfa on the right. The game would ultimately highlight one of the major problems that can arise when fielding a 4-4-2 with only two central midfielders- the tendency to get overrun in the center of the park against a team fielding more than two central midfielders. Manchester United fielded a 4-4-2 as well but they opted for a narrow diamond with Wayne Rooney at attacking midfield, Michael Carrick playing the holding role, and Tom Cleverley and Shinji Kagawa getting up and down the pitch as "shuttlers." Outnumbered 2 vs. 4 in the middle of the park, Newcastle couldn't compete for the ball in midfield and Manchester United dominated possession and went up 2-0 within 15 minutes.
After the game there were some interesting comments from Newcastle supporters on various discussion boards about whether they are a better side playing a 4-4-2 with Cisse and Ba alongside one another as center forwards or playing with Cisse as a lone center forward with Ba occupying a role on the left in either a 4-3-3, 4-5-1 or 4-2-3-1 as they did at times last season. Using Ba on the left in any of the latter three formations allows Newcastle to play three central midfielders rather than the two of their traditional 4-4-2. This should enable Newcastle to compete better in midfield against teams playing more than two central midfielders. However, it also means opposition center backs only have one center forward to worry about (typically Cisse). They can mark the forward with one center back while the other tucks in to provide cover. In a 4-4-2, both center backs are occupied by strikers and therefore don't have the luxury of another center back providing cover if a defensive mistake is made.
Which system is better for Pardew's side depends largely on the quality and formation of the opposition. Against opponents who line up in a 4-4-2, I fancy Cabaye and Tiote's chances to win the midfield battle and, in those circumstances, think it's usually a fine strategy for Newcastle to also field a 4-4-2. In a 2 v. 2 central midfield battle, Tiote and Cabaye will usually be able to get on the ball and pick out Cisse and Ba who are big, powerful and good finishers capable of giving any center back pairing in the league fits. However, against teams that play with a third center midfielder, it becomes really difficult for Cabaye and Tiote to compete for possession and find opportunities to knock balls into the two forwards.
To provide a brief comparison, in games in which Ba and Cisse have been on the field together as a center forward pairing in a 4-4-2, Newcastle score an average of 1.06 goals and concede an average of 1.3 goals (note: I only included goals scored and goals conceded that occurred when both men were on the field; goals for and against that occurred after one or both had been substituted were not included). In games in which Cisse plays center forward and Ba plays on the left in either a 4-3-3, 4-5-1 or 4-2-3-1, Newcastle score an average of 1.2 goals and concede an average of 1.2 goals. This very basic comparison suggests Newcastle have been slightly better offensively and defensively in formations with Cisse in the middle and Ba on the left than in a 4-4-2. Of course, without accounting for other very important factors like the quality of Newcastle's opponent and the formation of their opponent, we can't say with any certainty that the reason for the differences in performance comes down to formation. In the near future I'll try to provide a game-by-game analysis of how Newcastle's formations have fared against different opposition formations to get a better of idea when Pardew should be pairing Ba and Cisse in a 4-4-2 and when he should play one wide in a system with three center midfielders.
Arsenal will line up in their usual 4-2-3-1. With Diaby out due to a hamstring injury, we may see Ramsey slide back from an attacking right-sided position to a central position alongside Arteta. Coquellin was given the start alongside Arteta in the Champions League in midweek but against a West Ham side that lacks a strong creative presence in the center of midfield, Arteta should be fine occupying the holding midfield role on his own. Ramsey will provide more going forward than Coquellin. Despite a run of relatively unimpressive performances, Oxlade-Chamberlain will likely be given the start on the right. With Andy Carroll expected to be given the nod at center forward for West Ham, expect Per Mertesacker to replace Koscielny to provide some height at the back.
Expect West Ham to line up in a 4-2-3-1 that operates more as a 4-5-1 when Arsenal are in possession, with the two wingers dropping back alongside Diame and Noble to form two banks of four. Jarvis looked lively on the left wing in West Ham's 2-1 win over QPR Monday but, against Arsenal, Sam Allardyce may opt for the more defensive Matthew Taylor. O'Brien and Reid both picked up knocks in the QPR game. Reid is expected to play while O'Brien's status is less certain- we could see George McCartney replace him at left back. Andy Carroll is expected to be given the start after he returned from a hamstring injury Monday.
West Ham
O'Brien (McCartney) and Demel will likely be fairly reluctant to join in the attack when in possession so as not to leave spaces behind them for Podolski and Oxlade-Chamberlain to counter into.
Diame, Nolan and Noble will all look to shuffe the ball into wide areas to the wingers Vaz Te or Jarvis (if he plays). They'll try to either hit an early ball into Carroll towards the back post or take on the Arsenal outside backs and then cross. When West Ham do look for Carroll at the back post, he'll have the option of either going for goal himself or knocking the ball down. Nolan will look to get close to him to win the second ball.
West Ham's back four will play long balls directly into Carroll. When they took this direct route Monday with Carlton Cole at forward, Jarvis would cut in from the left wing and run behind Cole to get on the end of a flicked header.
The Hammers will try to win as many free kicks as possible. They'll hoof the ball in towards Carroll from set pieces anywhere on the field and look to get on the end of his knock downs.
Arsenal
The Gunners should dominate possession the center of midfield.
West Ham will likely play a 4-5-1 in defense with the wingers dropping back to form a bank of four with Diame and Noble. Jenkinson and Gibbs should be brave with their offensive positioning, getting into advanced positions and pushing the West Ham wingers deep into their own half. This will leave Carroll isolated when West Ham do recover possession. They'll be forced to knock it long towards Carroll and hope he can hold possession until the midfield transitions forward.
With Gervinho at center forward, Arsenal will be very flexible in the center of the park. Look for Cazorla, Gervinho and Ramsey to find pockets of space in between the lines to get on the ball. They'll play short combinations of passes and look for seams in the back four to get in behind. They could find it difficult against a crowded back four.
Arsenal have to improve their set piece defending. Three of the four goals they've conceded in the Premier League have come from set pieces and in West Ham they're facing an opponent who thrives at scoring from deadball situations. Koscielny was largely responsible for the two goals conceded to Chelsea last weekend and in all likelihood he'll be replaced by the taller Mertesacker to provide some height. However, despite his 6'6" frame, Mertesacker's aerial ability has at times been suspect. He'll have to be diligent in aerial challenges with Carroll.
West Ham scored twice from lofted crosses to the back post to secure a win in a gritty game lacking in technical quality.
Combined, the two sides completed just 504 passes, the third fewest in a Premier League game this season (Reading vs. Stoke produced a remarkably low 369 completed passes and Norwich vs. QPR had just 455 completed passes).
West Ham lined up in a 4-5-1 with Carlton Cole given the start at forward. Andy Carroll returned to the substitutes bench after being sidelined with a hamstring injury. QPR employed a 4-4-2 with Djibril Cisse and Bobby Zamora at forward. Shaun Wright Phillips played right wing and Ji Sung Park operated on the left but slightly more narrow.
Central Midfield Zone
West Ham's 4-5-1 gave them a man advantage in the center of midfield and they used their numerical superiority to completely prevent QPR's two central midfielders, Esteban Granero and Alejandro Faurlin, from getting on the ball. With virtually no presence in the center of midfield, QPR struggled to link play between defense and attack and were forced too often to hit hopeful long balls to the corners for Cisse and Zamora. Faurlin and Granero completed just 46 and 35 passes respectively, fairly low numbers for center midfielders. Combined they completed only 20 passes in the attacking third. It was apparent within 25 minutes that QPR needed an extra man in the center of midfield to allow them to get some possession and build play through the midfield. However, Mark Hughes stuck with just the two center midfielders for the whole first half and QPR continued to struggle to develop any rhythm in their play.
West Ham's Crossing and Direct Play
Despite their numerical advantage in the center of midfield, West Ham showed little interest in using the extra man to control possession. They looked to get the ball in wide areas to wingers Matthew Jarvis and Ricardo Vaz Te to send crosses into the box or knock the ball long into Cole for him to flick on. The midfield trio of Kevin Nolan, Mark Noble and Mohamed Diame completed just 26, 46 and 22 passes respectively. When they did get the ball they looked to shuffle it to Vaz Te and Jarvis. As is so often the case at West Ham, Cole was often an isolated figure up front but he did well to hold the ball up and flick on aerial challenges. When the Hammers played the ball long out of the back, Jarvis would tuck in and run behind Cole for the flick. It was pretty rudimentary stuff but QPR never looked comfortable defending crosses into the box.
Substitutions
Sam Allardyce was forced to make two like-for-like substitutions in the first half when Winston Reid and Joey O'Brien had to exit due to injury for West Ham. James Tomkins replaced Reid and George McCartney replaced O'Brien.
After 56 minutes Hughes finally addressed the need for extra bodies in the center of midfield and replaced Wright-Phillips with Samba Diakite and Park with Adel Taarabt. Diakite played in the middle, forming a central midfield trio with Fuarlin and Granero. Taarabt played narrow on the left but cut into the middle frequently and seemed to be given free reign to move into positions to get on the ball. The change in shape paid immediate dividends for QPR. Diakite provided an extra body in the midfield and some powerful runs forward while Taarabt gave QPR some creativity and urgency in the final third. Immediately the home sign began to control the play and were finally able to effectively transition the ball from the defensive third to attack. Taarabt's goal was a bit of individual brilliance but he was able to cut in from the left and take the shot because West Ham's center midfielders were occupied elsewhere.
With his side clinging to a 2-1 lead and being overrun in the center of the park, Allardyce would have been wise to use his final substitution to pull either Jarvis or Vaz Te for a player that could compete and win balls in the center of midfield. Yossi Benayoun and Gary O'Neil were the only two midfielders on the West Ham subs bench so O'Neil probably would have been the preferred choice. However, Allardyce elected to go with another like-for-like sub, replacing Cole with Carroll.
Just three minutes after Carroll's introduction, Diakite picked up a second yellow for QPR. Their brief spell of midfield dominance ended and West Ham were able to see out the 2-1 win.
Conclusion
This was a game of rather poor quality but an entertaining one to watch develop nonetheless. Against a relatively combative West Ham center midfield three, Hughes should have moved away from his 4-4-2 with wingers earlier to get an extra body in the center of midfield. He ultimately made the right substitutions but why he waited 11 minutes into the second half when it was painfully obvious QPR had no midfield presence is a mystery.
"The fishing fleet lies dark against the sun-washed sea. Along the Tyrrhenian waterfront, a stressed football manager, unable to sleep, takes an early-morning walk. Oblivious to the shrieking of the gulls and the haggling of the dockside mongers, he strides on, asking himself again and again how he can get the best out of his side, ponders how he can strengthen a defence that, for all his best efforts, remains damagingly porous. As he paces the harbour, churning the problem over and over in his head, a boat catches his eye. The fishermen haul in one net, swollen with fish, and then behind it, another: the reserve net. This is his eureka moment. Some fish inevitably slip the first net, but they are caught by the second; he realises that what his side needs is a reserve defender operating behind the main defense to catch those forwards who slip through. That manager was Gipo Viani, his team was Salernitana, and his invention was catenaccio."
-Excerpt from Jonathan Wilson's Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics on the development of catenaccio, the system made famous by Helenio Herrera at Inter Milan in the 1960s. The system employed a libero, or sweeper, who sat in behind a line of man marking defenders to provide cover and focused on counter attacking with long balls out of the back. In Herrera's version, the libero played behind four man marking defenders (in other versions the libero sat behind three defenders), creating a five man defense in a 5-3-2 formation. Inter would win three Italian league titles, two European Cups and two Intercontinental Cups under Herrera.
Herrera's version of catenaccio ultimately fell out of favor after Inter were beaten 2-0 by Ajax in the final of the 1972 European Cup. Inter's rigid four man markers were drug all over the field by the fluid movement of Ajax's total football and, subsequently, zonal defending became the norm in professional football.
While man marking is a thing of the past and no top level teams use a traditional libero, certain teams have employed systems that, if not directly influenced by catenaccio, have stemmed from the need to address the same concerns catenaccio was attempting to address: particularly the need to have a free man at the back to provide cover. Juventus's current 3-5-2 system is quite similar to Hererra's 1-4-3-2 catennacio. Both used three central defenders. Although Juventus's three central defenders are more fluid and there is no designated libero to sit deep, the idea is to allow two to pick up attackers moving into their zone while one can drop slightly deeper and provide cover, the same philosophy behind Herrera's system (although Herrera's two center backs marked men rather than zones). Three central defenders allow Juventus's full backs to push higher up the field into attacking positions when in possession, operating as what we call wing backs. Again, this is something Hererra was doing in the 1960s. With ample cover in the center of defense, he would allow left back Giacinto Facchetti license to push on and join in the attack.
Michael Cox has written in his Zonal Marking blog of teams using a more modern version of a sweeper whose positioning is different to that of the traditional deep lying sweeper. He suggests the modern version of a sweeper is a defensive center midfielder that plays in front of a four man defense with attacking outside backs. When his team is in possession, this holding midfielder drops into the center of defense while the two center backs move wide on either side of him, forming a back three. This gives the two outside backs the freedom to push into the attacking third without leaving only two center backs to defend any counters that may spring. Barcelona have used this system to great effect with Sergio Busquets dropping between center backs Carles Puyol and Gerard Pique, allowing Dani Alves and Erica Abidal (now Jordi Alba) to get into very attacking positions. I highly recommend this article from Cox if you want a more detailed explanation on the use of this more modern sweeper system. Jonathan Wilson also wrote a fascinating piece on this subject for the Guardian back in 2010 that you can see here.
Although both Barcelona and Juventus's systems represent modern day versions of sweeper systems, they're quite different in style and philosophy. The defense in Juventus's 3-5-2 sits deeps, invites the opposition to get forward, then looks to spring quick counters. Barcelona's defense makes the field compact by holding a very high line while the 6 attacking players press the ball. Their attack is focused on ball retention and dominating possession. Both employ three at the back with fullbacks providing width high up the field when in possession, but they differ in where on the field they like to do their defending and the importance placed on keeping the ball. These two teams offer a stark example of how systems fairly similar in defensive shape can be quite different in practice.
