Friday, September 28, 2012

Preview: Arsenal vs. Chelsea

Possible Lineup :



Both sides will likely start in their normal 4-2-3-1 formations. Aaron Ramsey was brought into the Arsenal lineup last weekend against Manchester City on the right although his positioning was quite narrow, creating what was effectively a four man central midfield for Arsenal. This enabled Arsenal to control possession in the middle of the park in an impressive 1-1 draw at the Etihad and Wenger may look to stick with the young Welshman Saturday. Width will come from Podolski on the left and when Arsenal look to break it will likely be through him and Cazorla. Vermaelen is expected to be back in the side after illness sidelined him last weekend. Koscielny therefore will likely be relegated back to the bench despite a goal and an overall impressive performance at Manchester City.

Chelsea's starting XI is a bit more difficult to predict. Roberto Di Matteo has preferred Oscar in the center attacking midfield role in Chelsea's last two games, a 1-0 win over Stoke and a 2-2 Champions League draw with Juventus. Oscar was brought into the side against Juventus to defend Andrea Pirlo in his deep lying creative midfield role. Pirlo is tremendous at dictating the tempo of games and getting defenses out of position with his passing- by tasking Oscar with man marking him, RDM was looking to unsettle Juventus and prevent them from getting into any type of offensive rhythm. In Mikel Arteta, Arsenal have a creative deep lying midfielder similarly gifted at dictating the tempo of games. RDM may well use a similar strategy as he did against Juventus, unsettling Arsenal by using Oscar to keep him off the ball. If Oscar does get the nod at center attacking midfield, expect Hazard and Mata to play on either side of him. They'll drift inside and switch sides frequently. Given Hazard's dribbling ability and the relative inexperience of Arsenal right back Carl Jenkinson, look for Hazard to start on the left and try to take on Jenksinson with the dribble.



  1. If Ramsey starts on the right and drifts towards the center, as he did against Manchester city, it could cause Chelsea some serious problems in midfield. It would give Arsenal a 4 v. 3 advantage in the middle of the park (Arteta, Diaby, Cazorla, Ramsey vs. Mikel, Lampard, Oscar). Mikel would likely stay close to Cazorla, Lampard would have to keep an eye on Ramsey and more than likely Oscar will stay close to Arteta to take away Arsenal's deep lying creative threat and the person who dictates tempo for the Gunners. Therefore we could see Diaby unaccounted for meaning he'll have the space to make those powerful runs forward with the ball. The numerical advantage would also suggest Arsenal could boss the midfield and dominate possession.
  2. How adventurous Ivanovic is getting forward could be another key factor. He enjoys joining in the attack but isn't particularly quick to recover when Chelsea lose possession. Therefore Chelsea can at times be susceptible to counters down the right side (last season's Champions League away defeat to Napoli is a good example). With Lucas Podolski occupying the left side for Arsenal, the Gunners have a player who tracks back and defends well but also has the pace to get in behind the opposition right back when Arsenal win possession (Arsenal's first goal against Liverpool is a perfect example). If Ivanovic is adventurous and plays high up the pitch, expect Podolski to enjoy plenty of room down the left to sprint into. If I were RDM I'd be a bit cautious with the Serbian's positioning.
  3. If Chelsea do play deep and allow Arsenal to control possession, do Arsenal have the ability to unlock a crowded defense? So far draws to Sunderland and Stoke, Arsenal's two opponents that defended deep with two banks of four, suggest they do not. Without a ruthless finisher like Van Persie could struggle to turn dominant possession into goals.
  4. Chelsea would be wise to play Hazard on the left. While Arsenal's right sided defenders Mertesacker and Jenkinson have had solid starts to the season, neither player instills the confidence in their one v. one defending ability to deal with someone as quick and clever with the dribble as Hazard. He could give those two fits. 
  5. Chelsea looked desperately short of ideas last weekend when Stoke played them deep and kept their defense compact in the center of the pitch. Both Mata and Hazard like to come inside to get on the ball when they occupy wide roles so the Blues can become a bit narrow and a bit one dimensional. There's virtually no chance Arsenal will sit deep and allow the Blues to take the game to them at home (in all likelihood it'll be the other way around) but the Gunners should take note of how much Chelsea have struggled under RDM when they're forced to take the game to the opponent. They're more dangerous on the break and Arsenal should look to force them to slowly build attacks from the back.
  6. Too often this season Chelsea have given the ball away cheaply and left their back four exposed to counters (John Obi Mikel's giveaway that led to Juventus's second goal in the Champions League is an obvious example). It's crucial that when Mikel and Lampard advance up the field Chelsea keep hold of the ball or Cazorla will have a field day breaking into space behind the two holding midfielders.

Thursday, September 27, 2012

Links, 9/27/12 Edition

  • Michael Cox: Why the hate for zonal marking?
    •  "The chief criticism of defending zonally is that no one takes responsibility, an argument that misses the point entirely. Ex-coaches who persist with this line of debate are actually adopting quite a cowardly approach -- "No one takes responsibility" is a synonym for "There's no player I can blame." Ironically, it also demonstrates that they're unwilling to take responsibility themselves."
  • Chris Rowland: Football and Finance, Liverpool and the top six
    • " I hope I have been able to show a number of things. First, a realisation of just how catastrophically wrong things went in the years ’09/10 – ’10/11. Liverpool had turned into a club who changed managers on a yearly basis, wasted vast sums on a phantom stadium which couldn’t possibly be financed, had begun the trend of decreased transfer spending and swapped it for vast ineffective wage inflation, relying on player sales to break even."
  • Jonathan Wilson: The question: How troubling is Liverpool's start
    • Already there has been a marked improvement in pass completion, up from 80.9% to 86%, and from 73.24% to 78.9% in the opposition half. To put that into context, last year's figures were the best for Liverpool over a full season since Opta began collating data in 2006-07.The problem is all too familiar. Last season Liverpool converted only 9.13% of their chances, the lowest figure since Opta began producing its reports. It had been 13.59% the previous season but then Liverpool managed just 11.4 shots per game. When Liverpool finished second in 2008-09, they had 15.1 shots per game and converted 13.46% of their chances. But if 9.13% looked bad, this season's figure is far worse: a meagre 5.97%.
       

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Everton 3-0 Swansea: Everton attack down left and exploit Fellaini's aerial ability

Everton used Marauane Fellaini's height advantage on dead balls and attacked almost entirely down the left through Leighton Baines and Steven Peinaar in a dominant 3-0 win over Swansea at Liberty Stadium.

David Moyes' side set out in a 4-4-1-1 with Victor Anichebe getting the start at center forward for the injured Nikica Jelavic with Fellaini tucked in behind him. Swansea played their normal 4-2-3-1 with Pablo Hernandez given the start on the right over Nathan Dyer and Leon Britton left on the subs bench.

Everton Press
Defensively, Everton pressed the Swansea back four with Anichebe, Peinaar, Fellaini, and right midfielder Kevin Mirallas. Leon Osman and Phil Neville sat deeper in the center of the midfield closer to the Toffees' back four. This created a gap between the four players pressing and the two holding midfielders but it wasn't space Swansea was able to exploit. The high pressing of Everton's four most advanced players prevented Swansea from settling into any sort of a rhythm in the attacking third of the field. The Swans completed 322 passes in the game, just 29 fewer than Everton, but only 69 of those were in the attacking third (21%). Everton were happy to allow the Swansea back four to pass the ball sideways amongst themselves and the Welsh side rarely looked like penetrating into the attacking third.

Everton Attack
Going forward, Everton focused its attack on the left side of the pitch where Baines and Peinaar combined throughout the afternoon with some tidy interchanges. The two accounted for the second and fourth most pass combinations in the game- there were 15 Baines to Peinaar combinations and 14 Peinaar to Baines combinations. Often Anichebe would drift to the left as well, overloading the right side of the Swansea defense while Fellaini would move into the center of the box, offering a dangerous physical presence to feed the ball into. The graphic below shows Everton's passes in the final third. Notice the number of those that occurred down the left hand side.



Interestingly, Everton's one goal that didn't result from a set piece came from a rare counter down the right flank. Fellaini won the ball deep in his own half and found an outlet pass to Peinaar who had drifted to the opposite side of the field. The South African found Mirallas bursting through the middle and the Belgian tucked it home.

Moyes also clearly set out to exploit Fellaini's height on set pieces, as he did in their season opening win over Manchester United. Any free kick the Toffees earned within 50 yards of the goal they'd get numbers into the box and lump it to the back post for Fellaini. Swansea had a miserable time dealing with the tall Belgian all afternoon and the tactic bore fruit for Everton in the 22nd minute when Fellaini won a high dead ball at the back post and flicked on for Anichebe who finished from 6 yards out to open the scoring. Replays showed Fellaini had clearly handled the ball into the path of Anichebe but the defending was poor from Ashley Williams to allow Fellaini to get the initial touch with his chest. The Belgian would go on to score himself in the 82nd minute, heading in another set piece from the left side at the front post.

Conclusion
Everton's four man high press prevented Swansea from getting any sort of meaningful possession in the attacking third. Swansea were entirely unable to cope with Baines and Peinaar down Everton's left side and failed to deal with aerial challenges with Fellaini. In the end the home side was fortunate it was only 3-0 as Anichebe was guilty of missing a couple of very good opportunities. Moyes will be thrilled with his side's performance as they continue their uncharacteristically bright start to the season. 

Wednesday, September 19, 2012

Tactics recap: Juventus 2-2 Chelsea

Most journalists and commentators will likely say this evening's 2-2 Champions League draw between Juventus and Chelsea was a fair result. In truth, the west Londoners were probably a bit fortunate to emerge with the home point on the balance play. Chelsea opened a two goal first half lead through a pair of Oscar goals inside two minutes of each other. However, after drawing a goal back late in the first half through Arturo Vidal, the Italian side dominated the second and although they finished the game with fewer shots on goal, they generally looked more threatening going forward. Chelsea looked vulnerable to balls played in behind the back four throughout the evening and ultimately conceded the equalizer when Fabio Quagliarella was able to time his run and finish a break away to complete the two goal comeback.

Both teams lined up in their usual formations- Juventus set out in a 3-5-2 while Chelsea opted for a 4-2-3-1. Chelsea, reacting to the creative threat of Andrea Pirlo from the base of the Juventus midfield, made one significant lineup change we've not seen from the Blues thus far. Oscar was brought in to play centrally just behind Torres, making his first Chelsea start, while Eden Hazard was shifted to the left. Oscar is a better tackler than Hazard and more used to being given some defensive responsibility. Roberto Di Matteo clearly told the young Brazilian to remain close to Pirlo to deny Juventus the distribution channel of their most clever passer. Oscar performed the task well. Pirlo never really had a huge impact on the game.

With Juventus's narrow center back three, Chelsea were able to enjoy some success in the first half when Hazard and Ramires were able to get the ball in the channels behind Juve's wing backs Stephan Lichtsteiner and Kwaswo Asamoah. When the wing backs were able to track back Ramires and Hazard, the Chelsea wide players were able to drift inside and create space for unmarked overlapping runs from outside backs Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic. The problems for Chelsea came when they got the ball in these areas and needed to find a penetrating pass. All three of Juventus's center backs were able to stay narrow near their 18 yard box and usually had only Fernando Torres to worry about defending. Asking Torres to get on the end of a cross or through ball in a 1 v. 3 situation was a difficult ask and the Spaniard had a frustrating night. Oscar's goals were from solid individual efforts but weren't attributable to Chelsea's tactics.

With Pirlo largely taken out of the game by Oscar, Juventus were forced to get their attacks started elsewhere. They enjoyed success from two main channels. With two forwards, Juve were able to occupy both Chelsea center backs. Mirko Vucinic would check back deeper to the ball, forcing one Chelsea center back to follow him and allowing Sebastian Giovinco to move laterally into the space created Vucinic. Giovinco had a poor game and was ultimately subbed for Quaglierella. Quaglierella continued making these lateral runs into space and ultimately got in behind Chelsea's defense and converted a 1 v. 1 with Cech. Juve's other main attacking threat came from their more advanced center midfielders Vidal and Claudio Marchisio. The two were able to make darting runs into towards the 18 that Frank Lampard and John Obi Mikel had a nightmare of a time dealing with. The combined well for Juventus's opening goal.

Chelsea were also particularly poor at keeping possession in the second half. They wanted to sit deep and keep possession to kill the clock off but through a combination of Juventus's higher pressing and their own sloppiness they struggled to ever dictate the tempo. Mikel's giveaway that led to Juve's second goal is noteworthy but he was hardly the only one guilty of squandering possession.

The Italians will be more pleased with the away point but they were the more impressive side throughout the bulk of the match.

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Thoughts on USA 1-0 Jamaica

The US looked impressive in the first half of their crucial 1-0 win over Jamaica last night in World Cup qualifying and kept a good enough defensive shape in a nervy final half hour to hold on for the three points. Despite failing to score in the opening 45 minutes, the US dominated possession with 79 percent and created a number of fine scoring opportunities. They struck the woodwork three times and forced decent saves from Jamaican goalkeeper Dwayne Miller. The breakthrough came via a Herculez Gomez freekick in the 55th minute. In truth Miller should have made the save, but the US had been good value for their lead.

Jurgen Klinsmann made five changes to the side that started in Kingston Friday evening. Right back Steve Cherundolo returned from a calf strain to replace Michael Parkhurst, Carlos Bocanegra replaced Clarence Goodson at center back, and Danny Williams, Graham Zusi and Jose Torres were brought into the midfield while Kyle Beckerman and Maurice Edu sat. Dempsey was moved forward to a withdrawn forward position behind Herculez Gomez, demoting Jozy Altidore to the bench.

The US played something like a 4-1-3-1 with Williams playing as a holding midfielder behind Zusi, Jones, and Torres and Dempsey operating just behind Gomez. Zusi brought width and a direct vertical threat down the right, while Torres brought composed passing on the left. He also frequently drifted inside to offer an additional passing option for Williams and Jones. Both outside backs in Cherundolo and Fabian Johnson did a fine job overlapping into space when Torres and Zusi came inside. The US looked particularly threatening down the right side with combinations between Zusi and Cherundolo, though the Hanover 96 captain struggled with his final ball.

Jamaica's defense sat particularly deep, often keeping all four defenders within 12 yards of the goal when the US were in the final third. Their deep line created a great deal of space for the US just outside the 18 and the Americans looked dangerous when they made delayed runs into this area (recall Danny Williams' strike that struck the post and Zusi's volley blasted over the bar came from this area). Their movement was fluid and they were able to penetrate gaps in the Jamaican defense with relative ease. That they failed to score despite such an overwhelmingly dominant first half came down to a combination of good goalkeeping, bad luck, and poor finishing.

Perhaps fittingly, the US's revenge came in the form of a freekick, the area of the game the Jamaicans had executed so well to shock the Americans in Kingston. After going down a goal, Jamaica committed more men forward and pressed the US higher up the field. In response, the US began playing much more direct. Faced with the threat of the pacey Jamaicans aggressively closing in on the ball, Klinsmann could be seen on the sideline frantically urging his back four and midfielders to knock the ball long into the corners.

This wasn't a time-wasting strategy the US was employing to kill the clock off; they were doing it with 25 minutes still remaining. Given Klinsmann expressed desire to Latinize American soccer and the success the US had in possession in the first half (they finished the half with 79 percent possession), it seemed a little surprising that Klinsmann would resort to hitting long balls for the forward to chase while keeping a tidy defensive shape with the other players.

However, the strategy made perfect sense. At no point in the course of three halves of soccer had Jamaica shown they could break down a compact US defense in the run of play. They simply don't have the technically ability to break down a team defending with two banks of four. By playing long balls into Jamaica's defensive third, Klinsmann was minimizing the ability of the Jamaicans to force turnovers in midfield and counter at the US defense with numbers. Even if Herculez Gomez (and then Jozy Altidore) was unable to get on the end of these long balls, the US was still forcing Jamaica to patiently build from the back against a crowded defense. In effect, they were forcing Jamaica to rely on their technical ability rather than their athleticism to get an equalizer. Despite a nervous-looking finish, the Jamaicans only really troubled Howard once.

The decision of Klinsmann to move to a more direct and defensive setup after getting the go-ahead goal also signals that he's not entirely confident in his team's ability to kill off games by knocking the ball around and preventing the opponent from getting possession (the way a team like Spain would see out an important game). He was clearly concerned about giving the ball away cheaply in midfield and giving the Jamaicans opportunities to counter. That's a concern I shared and given the US's precarious position in the group going into the game, minimizing risk seemed a wise move.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

A conversation on US tactics under Klinsmann and Bradley

Between the U.S. Men's National Team's away  loss to Jamaica last Friday (September 7) and tonight's match versus Jamaica in Columbus, Ohio, Daniel and I exchanged several emails discussing what went wrong in Kingston and what tactical changes the team has adopted under Klinsmann. A lightly edited version of the email conversation follows.

Daniel: I'm frankly confused as to what the thinking behind the US tactics was. Why press against Jamaica? They don't pass the ball out of the back; they just hoof it forward. Pressing isn't going to disrupt their build up. Instead, the US players are just worse off in terms of their defensive positioning. The strangest part is when Jamaica had possession in their attacking half and even third, the US continued with a press. Jamaica are weak in possession. Why not sit back, defend with two banks of four, and let the Jamaicans make the error? The result of the US pressing to try to force errors was, of course, conceding free kicks in dangerous positions. I know a lot of people, myself included, complained about Bob Bradley. His tactics might not have been terribly exciting, but they were pragmatic and made sense in Concacaf qualifying. Jurgen Klinsmann seems either naive or idealistic.

Kyle: Surely not idealistic. I thought Klinsmann said in numerous interviews he changed the team's shape based on the players available and the opposition. That suggests pragmatism to me. Did the US play ugly under Bradley? For some reason my memories are of the US scoring a lot and conceding a lot.

Daniel: I think the primary difference between the US style of play under Bradley and under Klinsmann is that the team are more likely to press under Klinsmann. I don't think the play is any prettier though. Bradley definitely preferred a 4-4-2, and that also seems to be the formation that Klinsmann has settled on. Though Klinsmann sometimes plays more of a 4-4-1-1 than a 4-4-2, and a 4-4-1-1 can morph into a 4-2-3-1 depending how high the wide players are. But, I am honestly struggling to remember how the US played under Bradley so who knows!

Kyle: What would you call the formation in the Jamaica game? 4-3-1-2? 4-3-2-1? 4-3-3? I guess they're all the same. It was a lineup void of creativity, but on paper seems like the perfect one to retain a one goal lead for 90 minutes. Playing three central midfielders, all of whom are known more for their tackling and/or defensive positioning than their creativity, in theory, seems like a formation designed to prevent the opposition from scoring. The way that formation was actually employed was a different story, and I'm not so sure what the actual plan was. I think the 4-3-3 could have been fine had it been executed a little differently. Jamaica's outside midfielders were not threatening--at no point did they show they could put a dangerous ball in the box--so I thought keeping the defense compact in the center of the field was fine. However, the weird pressing thing where certain guys were chasing the ball and others were playing deep created space between the seams for Jamaican players to receive the ball and get fouled. We know how that turned out. The positioning was downright bizarre.

Daniel: I think the US were trying to play a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield. I admittedly didn't watch the first half, but from what I read, Beckerman was sitting at the bottom of the diamond. When I tuned in for the second half, it looked more like the US were playing, as you suggested, a 4-3-1-2. That's a pretty subtle distinction and possibly a distinction without a difference. From what I saw, Dempsey rarely defended behind the ball. He would sometimes press the Jamaican midfielders from behind, but it seemed like the US defended with a bank of four (the back four) and a bank of three (the three midfielders at the bottom and sides of the diamond). To be clear, I am not trying to blame Dempsey; it's pretty obvious that his instructions were not to defend behind the ball.

As most everyone noticed, the US midfield three (if I say midfield three, I am excluding Dempsey) seemed to pressure the Jamaican players on the ball in our own defensive half and third to try to force a turnover rather than containing, maintaining a disciplined defensive shape, and waiting for the Jamaicans to make an error.

However, I am undecided as to whether the low press by the US midfield three was the cause of the problem or only a symptom of the problem. That is, were the three midfielders told to apply pressure on the player with the ball, or did they press because of the large gaps between the players in the bank of three? If a wide attacking player cuts to the inside, Edu (who was playing on the right) and Jones (on the left) may have felt like they had to close the player down otherwise the gap was large enough between them and Beckerman that the attacking player could easily split them. That wouldn't explain Beckerman pressing from a more central position, though from the short period of time that I saw him play, he didn't seem to be pressing nearly as much as Jones and Edu.

It is obviously considerably more difficult to defend with a bank of three than a bank of four, but it's criminal to defend with a bank of three and not be compact. Jones and Edu were usually positioned very wide, which left gaping holes between the three members of the midfield bank. If a team wants to defend with a bank of three in front of a bank of four, in all likelihood the outside backs will sometimes need to step up towards the bank of three to fill in the gaps in the wide areas. Because Jones and Edu were playing so wide, this couldn't happen, and instead gaps existed more centrally. Jones and Edu attempted to fill these gaps by pressuring players on the ball, but their pressure resulted in conceding free kicks in dangerous central areas rather than turnovers leading to dangerous counterattacks.

In sum, three interrelated factors seemed to contribute to the US defensive problems: (1) defending with a bank of four and a bank of three rather than the safer option of two banks of four, (2) the lack of compactness in the midfield bank of three, and (3) the pressing by the players in the bank of three that resulted in conceding set pieces in dangerous areas.

Kyle: That does make sense. I don't think you'll find too many examples of teams out there keeping three players in front of the ball and defending against a team playing with two center midfielders and two wide midfielders (that's what Jamaica were doing right?). It's always going to be difficult for a midfield three to cover the width of the field. Like you said, in that formation, you'd think it's the job of the midfield three to stay compact and shift as a unit. I don't think there is much of a problem if, say, Edu moves towards to the right sideline to close down the left-sided midfielder in possession as long Beckerman and Jones rotate that way as well to offer cover balance. Then it becomes the job of the left back to step forward from the back four and a little bit central to take away the threat of the big switch to the right midfielder (which you mention above).

I'm afraid we've discussed tactics more here than Klinsmann has with the team following the loss. All the solutions he's discussed with the media seem like they'd be quite obvious to a professional player: "move the ball quicker," "keep possession," "don't foul around the 18," "be patient." Of course those are all things that may help you win a game, but they don't get to the root of the problem which for me was team shape.

Daniel: Yeah, it's a meaningless answer to say "we need to keep the ball better" when asked what a team needs to improve upon. The real question is what you are going to do in order to keep the ball better. (Admittedly, they did say that they need to play simpler, short passes.) Like you, I frankly wasn't that concerned about their possession. Considering the lineup they fielded (which made sense given the personnel available and that this was an away World Cup qualifier in which a draw would have been an acceptable outcome) and the quality of the pitch, the US were never going to dominate possession. Again, as you noted, the team shape was much more problematic than possession.