Ranking the Premier League's most direct teams

“Direct football” or “long ball football” has mostly negative connotations in the modern era. It has become associated with a time in English football when pitches were more mud than grass, and the dominant attacking tactic was to launch high balls into lumbering center forwards to knock down in a 4-4-2 system. Indeed, it was England’s refusal to, until recently, replace direct play with the more fluid, short passing-based systems that were being used in continental Europe as early as the 1930s that has largely been blamed for its lack of success in international tournaments. Long ball football, so the reasoning goes, requires less individual technique and less sophisticated team movement off the ball. Simply whack a ball into a big center forward and hope he knocks it down into the path of a teammate close by or hit it over the top of the defense and hope a speedy forward can get on the end of it. It’s thought to be predictable and generally not the most effective way to use the ball.

In truth however, any assertion that direct play is unquestionably inferior to short passing because it requires less individual technique than dribbling by a defender or using a series of 15 tidy one touch passes to advance the ball 40 yards up the pitch is an incorrect one. Indeed, even in the modern game long passes have often proven to be an effective way to quickly break down an opposition defense. Long balls aren’t a problem in and of themselves. They can be used to stretch a defense and create valuable space between an opponents midfield and back four. Likewise a team can use them to exploit the speed or height and strength advantage an attacker has over opposition center backs. The problem with direct play is when it is overused and becomes the only method a side relies on to advance the ball. Only then does it become predictable and easy to defend. But the same thing can be said of Barcelona’s tiki taka. Relying too heavily on long spells of possession and quick short passes can allow the opposition to restrict the space the attacking side has to play in and deny the time on the ball creative players need to open up a defense.

Of course the most effective team tactics for any given side have to do with the strengths of its players and the players and tactics used by the opposition in any given game. This post will focus on how direct the 20 Barclay’s Premier League teams have been in the first two weeks of the season, the reasons some of them have had for playing direct (or indirect), and the results that different styles of play have produced for different clubs.

When I set out to judge how direct individual Premier League teams are, I first use the average number of long balls each team played per game as a measure of directness and rank teams based on that measure. Stoke City are nearly unanimously considered the most direct team in the Premier League. They’re big and strong, lacking in creative midfield players capable of clever short passing, and in Peter Crouch have a giant of a forward favored to win aerial challenges over just about anyone. However, the data show that after two games Stoke average the 12^th most long balls in the league, a curious result given Stoke are considered the most direct team. Should we assume then that Stoke have drastically altered their playing style over the summer and become less reliant on the long ball? 

As it turns out, we should not. The long balls per game statistic doesn’t tell the whole story of how much a team relies on long passes, as it doesn’t take into account possession and the number of long balls a team plays relative to short passes. For example, team A may have 80% of possession against their opponent team B resulting in them playing 60 long balls and 600 short passes. Team B has 20% of possession while hitting 50 long balls and playing 200 short passes. In this example, team A plays 10 more long passes than team B. They are not the more direct team, however. Their advantage in number of long balls played is attributable to them dominating possession and playing more of every kind of pass. Relative to the number of short passes they play, team A is far less direct. They have a ratio of 10 short passes for every one long ball (600/60=10) whereas team B plays only 4 short passes for every long ball (200/50=4). We can use this same short passes to long ball ratio with data on Premier League teams to rank them in terms of directness. This measurement is shown in the table below. Teams at the top of the table have a higher ratio of short passes to long balls and are therefore less direct than those at the bottom.

Using this method, Stoke are indeed the most direct team in the Premier League after two weeks, playing just 3.48 short passes per long ball. By contrast, Arsenal have been the least direct team, playing 11.08 short passes for every one long ball. Neither of these facts are particularly surprising. While Tony Pulis has always focused on physicality and territory at Stoke, Arsene Wenger has molded a side of mostly creative, technical players who are often small in stature. Interestingly, both teams have struggled to find the net in their first two games. Arsenal have yet to score, registering two goalless draws, one of which was to Stoke last Sunday. Stoke have scored just once in their opening two games.

The sample size is too small to enable us to predict whether either team will struggle to score all season and there are obviously other factors besides how direct a team is that influence number of goals scored. In the case of Arsenal, one big factor may be the loss of Robin Van Persie and the lack chemistry between Arsenal’s three big attacking summer signings Olivier Giroud, Santi Cazorla, and Lukas Podolski.

The data produce some other interesting findings. Both Liverpool and Tottenham brought in new managers this summer. Brendan Rodgers and Andre Villas-Boas were expected to bring new styles of play to their respective teams. Rodgers likes to build the attack from the back with patient buildup play and linking a number of shorts passes. At Swansea last season, his team had the third highest average possession percentage behind the two Manchester clubs. Villas-Boas prefers a pressing game where players expend energy high up the field to win the ball back and then get their rest while patiently knocking the ball around in possession. Neither system relies heavily on the long ball. However, both teams are in the bottom half of the table in terms of short passes per long ball, suggesting they’ve relied on direct play more than most teams. Liverpool have played 5.96 short passes per long ball, while Tottenham have played 5.67.

The data also show that Everton and Newcastle, two teams that finished in the top 7 of the Premier League last season, are among the most direct teams thus far. Newcastle have played 5.07 short passes per long ball and Everton have played just 4.7. These numbers make sense when we consider the strengths of each team and who they’ve played in their opening fixtures. Everton started the season with a home game to Manchester United. United had three injured center backs in Chris Smalling, Johnny Evans, and Rio Ferdinand and were forced to play Michael Carrick out of position in the center of defense alongside Nemanja Vidic. In Marouane Fellaini, Everton had a tall, strong midfielder able to dominate Carrick in the air and knock balls down for his teammates. Everton tried to exploit this mismatch all evening, continually sending long balls towards the towering Belgian. The direct style worked as Everton emerged 1-0 winners. Newcastle’s frequent use of the long pass early in the season likely has to do with the fact that its forward pairing of Demba Ba and Papiss Cisse are full of pace and able to use their powerful running to get in behind the opposition back four. The Magpies have creative midfielders in Johann Cabaye and Hatem Ben-Arfa capable of getting the ball on the floor and playing, but the direct threat of the two Senegalese forwards gives their attack another dimension and they’ll likely continue to look long over the top for them this season.

Again, a sample size of two games doesn’t necessarily reflect how a team will play throughout an entire season, but if we look at data from last season we can get a good idea of how direct we’d expect teams to be in 2012-2013 (at least those teams that have kept the same managers). The figure below shows the same short passes per long ball statistic. Notice Stoke were also the most direct team last season. They also scored the fewest goals in the league with just 36. Another point of interest is that four of the teams that finished in the top six of the table last season--Manchester City (1), Arsenal (3), Chelsea (6) and Manchester United (2)--were among the five least direct teams. This isn’t terribly surprising since these are among the biggest, wealthiest clubs in the league and can afford to bring in the most technically gifted players suited to play in a short passing system. The only top six finisher among the league’s 10 most direct teams was Newcastle. Three of the bottom four finishers were among the four most direct teams--Blackburn, Bolton, and QPR. This almost certainly has to do with the inability of smaller clubs to purchase the most technically gifted players capable of playing a short passing game. 

The table may lead us to conclude that relying on short passes produces superior results to playing direct football. This is somewhat misleading. Clubs like Manchester City, Manchester United, Chelsea, and Arsenal play less direct football in the Premier League because they have technically gifted players, and they gain a competitive advantage over most of their opponents by keeping the ball moving along the ground. It wouldn’t make any sense for Arsenal to set out launching long balls forward against Stoke City--they lose their competitive advantage doing that. But, it also doesn’t make sense for Stoke to try to tiki tika their way up the pitch against Arsenal--they don’t have the quality of players to do that. Their advantage over Arsenal is in their superior size and strength, so they play direct. In short, teams adopt styles that best utilize the strengths of their players and attack the weaknesses of their opposition. Not every team can have the quality of Europe’s top clubs and where there is a gap in talent between two sides, direct play will remain a tactic teams employ. 

Links, 8/28/12 Edition

• Micahel Cox: Fabulous Falcao
• Stylistically, he's something of a throwback -- he's a pure penalty box striker, the type that has become increasingly rare as coaches demand greater linkup play from their frontman. Some of his goals are scrappy and others are beautiful, but there's an incredible efficiency about all of his strikes. He's able to power in headers from unusual angles when his body shape seems wrong, while his feet are always in the right position to exploit a loose ball inside the penalty box. 

• Michael Cox: Liverpool 2-2 Manchester City: neither entirely comfortable with new approach
• Liverpool weren’t 100% comfortable playing high up the pitch and being told to pass out of the back, City weren’t 100% comfortable playing with a back three. Rodgers won’t change his approach – Mancini might have to, because City don’t immediately appear any stronger defensively or offensively, and he is under pressure to get immediate results. Rodgers will take more positives from this game – Allen’s passing, Sterling’s wing play, Coates’ calmness.

• Jonathan Wilson: Football has gone back to the back three, but why can be a mystery 
• Three years ago, playing three at the back had all but disappeared. It had died away in the late 50s and 60s as the W-M was superseded by a back four, and re-emerged in the mid-80s, in slightly different forms, with Carlos Bilardo's Argentina, Sepp Piontek's Denmark, Franz Beckenbauer's West Germany and Ciro Blazevic's Dinamo Zagreb... Yet three at the back has started to make a comeback. It began in Italy, with Udinese and Napoli. At Barcelona, the first and most successful stage of Pep Guardiola's season-long charge backwards through the evolution of tactics was a back three. Then Wigan Athletic started doing it. Now Manchester City have joined in. In fact, in the top divisions of Europe's top five leagues over the weekend, 12 teams used the shape (eight in Italy, two in England, one in Spain, one in France and none in Germany). Three at the back is back.

• Sid Lowe: Athletic Bilbao impotent as Marcelo Bielsa's project unravels apace
•  "We were," Bielsa admitted, "impotent in the face of the dimension of our opponent." The dimension of that opponent was gigantic: Arda Turan was consistently dangerous, Falcao's brilliance was barely believable and Atlético had destroyed Athletic in last season's Europa League final too. Bielsa talked of "antagonistic styles" and took the blame for not devising a strategy to impose upon Diego Simeone and his team. But it was not just about Falcao or Simeone or Atlético; there was something else, something deeper, something a little depressing. Something in that word: impotent.An inescapable feeling that Athletic Bilbao, the team that reached two finals and destroyed Manchester United at Old Trafford, are unravelling before his eyes.

Recap: Chelsea 4-2 Reading

Despite another impressive performance from new signing Eden Hazard, Chelsea struggled mightily to break down Reading's crowded defense and were extremely fortunate to emerge 4-2 winners. Just as they often did last year, Chelsea found it difficult to create meaningful goalscoring opportunities when the opposition allowed them to have the bulk of possession and forced them to patiently pick apart seams against two defensive banks of four. The Blues finished the game with just under 72% of possession but only had 7 shots on goal. Four of those shots were goals but the first was a penalty, the second came off a serious goalkeeping blunder, the third was clearly offsides, and the fourth came late when Reading's keeper had gone forward to attack a corner kick.

Chelsea's problem in breaking down compact defenses last season was largely due to the fact Juan Mata was the only creative passer in the Chelsea attack. As I mentioned in my preview to this game in the previous post, the strength's of their other advanced midfielders/wide forwards in the 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 systems last season- Kalou, Sturridge and Ramires- were mainly pace and the ability to advance the ball forward with the dribble. None of the three are exceptional passers. Chelsea's deeper lying midfielders last season, Meireles, Mikel and Lampard, were not of the deep lying creator mold of a Luka Modric, Xabi Alonso, or Andrea Pirlo. Meireles is a hardworking ball winner, Mikel is a very defensive holding player, and Lampard keeps the ball moving and makes well timed runs into the box but none are known for springing attacks with their clever passing. Thus, Chelsea were left with Mata as the sole player with the creativity to cut apart a defense with a vertical pass. As a result, against compact defenses Chelsea would play horizontal balls in midfield all afternoon without ever posing much of a penetrative threat. It was methodical, predictable and easy to defend.


Hazard is a player capable of penetrating the center of compact defenses both with the dribble and with creative forward passes. He brings to the side a directness they lacked in the center of the park last season. He's not content simply keeping the ball moving from side to side but instead likes to go to goal and attack vertically. He proved incredibly effective yesterday, getting into dangerous pockets of space between the seams of the Reading defense and completing 38 of 41 attempted passes in the attacking third (two of which were assists, see the figure below).  Just as they had at Wigan Sunday, Hazard and Mata interchanged between central and wide positions, with Mata given the freedom to come infield to collect the ball. The pair combined for the two highest pass combinations of the match with 18 Hazard to Mata combinations and 18 Mata to Hazard combinations.

With Hazard and Mata orchestrating moves forward Chelsea's struggles yesterday, unlike last season, had less to do with an absence of creativity and more to do with a lack of pace in their ball movement. At 72%, Chelsea had Barcelona-like possession stats but unlike Barcelona, who rapidly move the ball from player to player, they seemed too often to take an extra unnecessary touch, allowing Reading to comfortably rotate their defensive shape. They were also uncharacteristically loose in possession, Ramires particularly guilty of some untidy first touches and passes. Hazard was exceptional in possession but once he got rid of the ball the pace of Chelsea's movement stalled. As the second half progressed with Chelsea trailing 2-1, everything went through Hazard and Mata, with the Spaniard continuing to get in central positions in an effort to get on the ball more. As a result their shape became a bit narrow with the Blues trying to force the ball through the crowded center of Reading's defense. The figure below shows Juan Mata's second half passes in the attacking third. Notice how many of these passes came from central areas, specifically ones just outside the 18 yard box. The two were dangerous on the ball in these crowded pockets of space but Chelsea were struggling to stretch the Reading defense laterally by making threatening runs from wide areas.

The introduction of Sturridge gave the Blues needed width on the right and a new point from which to attack. Prior to his introduction Chelsea's only point of attack was through the middle and thus the center of Reading's defense was able to stay compact and simply check the runs and close the passing lanes of Torres, Mata and Hazard. With Chelsea offering little threat from the right, left back Ian Harte was able to pinch inside and provide additional cover through the middle. Sturridge's introduction forced Harte to defend wider on the right, leaving one less defender to provide cover in the box. Immediately Sturridge was able to use his pace to get around the much slower left back and cut in towards the front post. The threat of him cutting inside from the right left Reading's center backs with an additional concern- not only did they have to check runs coming from the center, an area Chelsea were trying to overload with Mata, Hazard, Lampard and Oscar, they also had to worry about shifting to provide cover for Harte if he were beaten by Sturridge on the outside. Although Sturridge was not involved directly in the third goal, it started when Chelsea had shifted Reading's defense to the right and quickly switched the point of attack to the left allowing Ashley Cole the space to make an unchecked run from left back into Reading's weak side defense.


If yesterday proved anything for Chelsea, it was that their new look attacking outfit will almost certainly experience some hiccups as the players take time to get used to one another. Their key playmaker in Hazard has been involved in only three competitive matches with the squad and Fernando Torres, the only true center forward at the club with whom they'll rely on heavily for goals, was very much a peripheral figure at the club last season. However, there have been hints of what could prove to be a bright future at Stamford Bridge as well, particularly from Hazard and Mata. The two have shown a good understanding of one another in the first two league fixtures and their ability to interchange positions and overload different areas of the field should cause serious matchup issues for opposition defenses. Against teams that pack the defense as Reading did yesterday, Chelsea will need to offer a point of attack from wide areas as Mata and Hazard both move centrally to try to use their combination passing. Wide threats will stretch the opposition defense and allow the two creative players the space to play clever through balls as they did for Chelsea's game-winning third goal yesterday.

Reading will offer Chelsea different challenge than Wigan

Chelsea's rather comfortable 2-0 win in their opening fixture at Wigan offered a display of the pragmatic efficiency the club has become associated with in the years since Jose Mourinho's arrival. After snatching both goals in the opening 7 minutes, the Blues were content to sit deep, absorb pressure with a compact defense and very cautiously move forward. Wigan had 52 percent of the possession, controlled 58 percent of the territory, and completed 113 passes in the final third to Chelsea's 44. Frank Lampard led Chelsea with 8 passes in the final third--7 Wigan players had as many or more passes in the final third. Despite dominating many of the offensive statistics, the Latics rarely looked like threatening Petr Cech's goal, and throughout the 90 minutes the result never appeared to be in doubt. It was hardly the kind of Barcelona-esque, stylish possession-based performance Roman Abramovich wants from Chelsea but the win was as easy they come.

In many ways the possession-based attacking philosophy of Wigan under Roberto Martinez plays directly into what proved to be Chelsea's strengths late last season--sitting deep and drawing opposition midfielders and full backs forward, then regaining possession and countering into the space they left vacated. Chelsea were much less comfortable when forced to unlock compact defenses with tidy possession and clever buildup play. Even against superior opposition Wigan are not a team that sits back and defends in banks of four with ten men behind the ball. Indeed, they used the same brave 3-4-3 formation Sunday that they used during their terrific late season run last year. They like to get on the ball and get numbers into the opposition half (evidenced by their dominance of passes in the final third). Inevitably that leaves them vulnerable to quick counter attacks which proved to be Wigan's undoing Sunday.

In the second minute Wigan advanced the ball into the attacking third through an impressive interchange of passes between right wing back Anderson Boyce and right forward Victor Moses down the sideline. Boyce then played the ball to Franco Di Santo about 24 yards from goal in the middle of the pitch. Shaun Maloney had drifted centrally from his left forward position, forcing right back Branislav Ivanovic to track his run for Chelsea. Maloney's clever movement left acres of space down the left flank for Maynor Figueroa to run into from his left wing back position. The movement was impressive from the Latics, but Di Santo was caught in possession before he could find Figueroa, leaving both wing backs high up the field and out of defensive position. Ivanovic collected the ball at Chelsea's 18, played a short pass to Juan Mata and took off into the space left vacated by Figeueroa. Two passes later and Eden Hazard had turned away from Ivan Ramis brilliantly, leaving Wigan's other two center backs hopelessly exposed. He found Ivanovic to his right who tucked the finish away coolly. Wigan had been undone in the blink of an eye by four quick passes. The buildup that led to Hazard winning the penalty that made it 2-0 was similar. Figueroa advanced to the touchline before hitting a poor cross directly to Cech. Cech quickly rolled the ball to Lampard who was left with acres of space down the middle to dribble into. Hazard drifted right into the space left empty by Figueroa's attacking run. He received a pass from Lampard, advanced the ball into the box and was ultimately hacked down by Ramis. Two quick counter attacks had effectively killed the game off inside 10 minutes.

Reading at Stamford Bridge will likely offer Chelsea a very different kind of challenge. Whereas Wigan bravely attacked with numbers and left themselves susceptible to the counter, Reading is expected to get bodies behind the ball and get into a compact defensive shape before looking to spring counterattacks of their own. Under Brian McDermott, Reading are an extremely organized outfit and conceded the fewest goals in the Championship last season. Chelsea will be forced to patiently keep possession and provide the creativity to unlock a crowded defense, something they struggled with at times last season. The addition of Hazard should certainly help in this regard. Last season Chelsea's wide outside forward and attacking midfield options were mainly Mata, Daniel Sturridge, Salomon Kalou and Ramires. Of those four, only Mata is known for his creative passing ability. Kalou, Ramires, and Sturridge are known for their pace and ability to advance the ball with the dribble but aren't especially technical players. Their skill sets mean they are more suited to playing a counter attacking style where they can run at defenders with pace rather than one centered around patient buildup play. Hazard is a player with good technique who brings both the ability to beat opponents off the dribble and to unlock them with a clever pass. Having two technical players behind Torres should make Chelsea a more threatening and unpredictable side when they come up against crowded defenses. The positioning and movement of those two today should be one of the more intriguing tactical elements of the match.

It will be interesting to see if Roberto Di Matteo's team sheet is influenced by the fact that Chelsea play three games in the opening seven days of the season. They face a strong Newcastle side at the Bridge Saturday. It's possible Di Matteo could opt to rest a usual starter or two in the hopes they'll be able to defeat an inferior Reading side today without a first choice 11. Look for Reading to try to frustrate Chelsea by limiting their space to move the ball in the attacking third and crowding the box. If Chelsea get an early goal they should cruise.

Match report: Arsenal 0-0 Sunderland, 8/18/12

For a third consecutive season, Arsenal opened up their Premier League campaign with a draw. Going back to last season, Arsenal now have gone 4 consecutive home matches without a win--their longest stretch of home games without a win since August 1995.

Arsenal dominated the possession/passing battle throughout the match. The Gunners had 70.1 percent of the possession and completed 637 passes to Sunderland's 222 passes. Arsenal's passing completion rate was an impressive 91 percent, while Sunderland completed 76 percent of their passes. It would be difficult to overstate the extent to which Arsenal out-passed Sunderland. In fact, in the figure below, I break up the game into 18 different 5-minute increments (e.g., minutes 0-5, minutes 6-10) and compare Arsenal and Sunderland's passing statistics. Sunderland completed more passes than Arsenal in only a single 5-minute period of the match. The height of the red bars indicate the number of passes Arsenal completed in each 5-minute increment, and the height of the black bars indicate the number of passes completed by Sunderland in each 5-minute increment.

Of course, a disparity in raw passing statistics can be misleading if most of the passing is concentrated in the middle and defensive thirds of the field. But, Arsenal also completed far more passes in the attacking third than Sunderland: 162 passes completed out of 201 attempted for Arsenal and 35 passes completed out of 61 attempted for Sunderland. Arsenal's passing dominance in the attacking third unsurprisingly resulted in far more shots than Sunderland: 23 total attempts for Arsenal vs. 4 total attempts for Sunderland.

The match data presented above would seem to suggest a far more unbalanced game than was actually the case. Sunderland defended very deep and were difficult to break down (see Kyle's post for more on the tactics employed in the game). Thus, while Arsenal were able to complete a lot of passes in the attacking third and generate far more shots than Sunderland, Sunderland restricted Arsenal to very few genuine scoring chances. In fact, only 3 of Arsenal's 23 shots were on goal, while 2 of Sunderland's 4 attempts were on goal. Both of Sunderland's shots on target came in the first 10 minutes of the game, the most dangerous of which came from a James McClean breakaway. Sunderland's only other 2 attempts both occurred later in the first half. Arsenal's best chance came in the 83rd minute when Santi Cazorla cleverly slipped a pass between 2 Sunderland defenders to set up Olivier Giroud only 8-10 yards from goal. Giroud could not convert, as his strike sent the ball wide past the post.

Arsène Wenger and Arsenal supporters are likely disappointed with the result, but they are almost certainly encouraged by some of the players' performances, especially Cazorla. The new signing was far and away Arsenal's most dangerous player. He led all players in several statistical categories. He created 7 scoring chances (no other player created more than 2). He completed 36 passes in the attacking third (next on the list is Mikel Arteta with 25 passes in the attacking third). And, Cazorla had more shots (4) than any other player. Gervinho was also impressive, especially in terms of his willingness to take on defenders. He had 10 successful take-ons (Theo Walcott ranked second with 5 successful take-ons). However, Gervinho attempted 20 take-ons, far more than any other player (Walcott again ranked second with 7 take-on attempts).

Arsenal's three big signings--Cazorla, Lukas Podolski, and Giroud--all featured in today's game. In addition, Abou Diaby returned from injury to play over 45 minutes for Arsenal for the first time since May 2011. The game was also Per Mertesacker's first match for Arsenal since he suffered an injury in early February. Given the new and recently repaired components in Arsenal's system, it would be premature to pass judgment at this stage.

Thoughts: Arsenal 0-0 Sunderland

Arsenal failed to make their 70% possession count as Sunderland put in a gritty defensive performance to emerge from the Emirates with a deserved 0-0 draw. It was a pretty straightforward tactical battle; Sunderland defended with two lines of four to restrict the space Arsenal had to play in while the Gunners controlled possession and looked to use quick passing to find gaps in the defense. Here are some of the more interesting developments and observations I noticed.

• The Wearsiders were content to get all 11 men behind the ball and force Arsenal to patiently pick them apart. They looked to counter through Sessegnon, McClean and Campbell and did so with some success early on. However, as the game wore on Arsenal closed off their outlet pass and Sunderland offered little going forward the final 65 minutes of the game. 
• With Sunderland dropping deep in two banks of four to restrict the space Arsenal had to play in, it was important for the Gunners to find space in between the lines to unlock the compact defense. New signing Santi Cazorla did this with considerable success early on in the match, moving into pockets of space between the Sunderland back four and midfield. However, Lee Cattermole began getting tight on Cazorla and the Spanish midfielder found it more difficult to find the time for a cutting pass as the game went on. He still found ways to get on the ball, often coming deeper to receive it. He played a brilliant ball to put fellow new signing Olivier Giroud through on goal but the Frenchman, who had recently come on to replace Podolski at center forward, scuffed his effort wide. 
• Despite starting as the loan center forward, Podolski often came very deep into the midfield to receive the ball. It’s understandable why he was doing this since the the central areas around the box were so crowded. However, it left Arsenal looking like they were playing a 4-6-0. The problem with that was Arsenal didn’t have anyone to stretch the Sunderland defense vertically and create space for Cazorla between the Sunderland back four and midfield. Giroud stayed closer to the Sunderland center backs which created more space for Cazorla and second half substitute Aaron Ramsey to float into. Ramsey got a decent look at goal from 18 yards out but his effort was extremely poor.
• In the first half Arsenal looked more dangerous when they were able to win possession from the Sunderland midfield and break quickly towards goal with 3 or 4 passes. They struggled when Sunderland were able to get all 10 men behind the ball. I thought at halftime it might be a good idea for Arsenal to concede some possession to the Sunderland midfield and press a little deeper towards the midfield line, the thinking being that they could push Sunderland out of their defensive shell opening up space behind the Black Cats’ midfield to counter into with speed. Indeed, Arsenal seemed to use this strategy and the game opened up very slightly in the middle stages of the second half. However, when Arsenal were able to break they were missing the final ball or and the presence of a poaching center forward in the box to put the ball in the net.

Preview 2012-13: Arsenal

Arsenal's summer transfer windows in 2011 and 2012 are a study in contrasts. In 2011, Arsenal were paralyzed as manager Arsene Wenger's stubbornness seemed to preclude the club from conducting their necessary business. The negotiations for the sales of Cesc Fabregas and Samir Nasri carried on for several weeks and likely interfered with the club's preparations for the upcoming season. Wenger seemed reluctant to close deals on quality players early in the window (e.g., Juan Mata). Only in the aftermath of a devastating 8-2 defeat to Manchester United on August 28, 2011 (the first time Arsenal had conceded 8 goals since 1896) did Wenger seem aware of how desperate the club's circumstances actually were. With only three days remaining before the close of the transfer window on September 1, he completed deals to bring in Mikel Arteta, Per Mertesacker, Andre Santos, Park Chu-Young, and Yossi Benayoun (on loan). While some of these additions proved quite useful to the club, Wenger only acted at the end of an abysmal month in which Arsenal somehow incurred 3 red cards and captured a single point out of a possible 9.

If the summer of 2011 demonstrated Wenger's deficiencies in the transfer market, the summer of 2012 has reminded observers of his primary strength: identifying and purchasing undervalued talent. Unlike 2011 when Wenger procrastinated buying replacements for wantaways Fabregas and Nasri, Wenger quickly moved to bring in replacements for Robin van Persie, the malcontent striker with only one year remaining on his contract. Far in advance of van Persie's public declaration that he would not be extending his contract with the club, Wenger had already negotiated the purchase of Olivier Giroud who scored 21 goals in France's Ligue 1 (joint top scorer) and Lukas Podolski who scored 18 goals in Germany's Bundesliga (joint 4th leading scorer). Remarkably, Wenger purchased Giroud and Podolski for £13m and £11m, respectively. In the current transfer market, these fees are paltry for players of their caliber of talent. Giroud and Podolski are not Wenger's only marquee purchases on the cheap, however. Arsenal understood that the precarious financial situation of Malaga in Spain's La Liga presented an opportunity. Malaga were (and probably still are) desperate for cash and fast, as several players filed complaints that they are owed back wages (among other debts owed). Arsenal, with plenty of cash on hand, may have negotiated a discounted fee for Santi Cazorla by paying most of it up-front to help alleviate Malaga's near-term financial woes. (In general, most transfer fees are paid over the course of a period of years rather than up-front.) The transfer fee for the highly creative midfielder is reportedly around £16m, which is a great bargain for a player of Cazorla's quality.

Wenger and the club certainly deserve plaudits for their activity in the transfer market thus far. Even so, more questions remain than have been answered by Arsenal's transfer activity. If van Persie leaves, which admittedly seems modestly less likely with each passing day, Arsenal lose 40 percent of their league goals from last season. Can the new additions compensate for this dearth of goals? Maybe but it's a big maybe. Adjusting to the Premier League can take time, and Giroud and Podolski are good players, but they are not of van Persie's quality.

Even more problematic for Arsenal, the back four are not improved from last season. Center back Laurent Koscielny had a fantastic season in 2011-12; can he maintain that level of play? Center back Thomas Vermaelen's positioning was very poor last season. Can he improve and play at the level that people expect him to play? While Per Mertesacker is an adequate backup at center back, if he is required to play regularly, as was the case last season, opponents will likely easily exploit his lack of pace. (As an aside, for someone as tall as Mertesacker is, he is incredibly weak in the air.) Left back Kieran Gibbs is a promising young player, but he seems prone to nagging injuries. He missed nearly 4 months of last season due to a hernia and related complications. Reserve left back Andre Santos is dangerous going forward, but he lacks the sort of defensive capabilities that are generally considered requisite to be, errr, a defender. Most worrisome for the club, right back Bacary Sagna will be out for the beginning portion of the season as he recovers from a broken leg suffered at the end of last season. I think his return in February of last season was incredibly important to Arsenal's resurgence in which they took 27 out of 30 possible points between February 4 and April 11. In my view, Arsenal are a substantially better team, both in attack and defense, with Sagna out on the field. Until Sagna is healthy, I believe that Arsenal are better off playing Francis Coquelin out of position at right back over Sagna's understudy at right back, Carl Jenkinson. Even though Coquelin is an improvement over Jenkinson, he is still a huge drop off in quality from Sagna.

In sum, Arsenal have made three very astute purchases in Giroud, Podolski, and Cazorla. They are in a better position leading up to the season than most fans would have anticipated after van Persie announced his intention to leave the club. Even so, whether Arsenal's attacking players can maintain the potency of their scoring threat in the absence of van Persie (should he leave), and whether the defense can improve from last season are questions to which the answers are far from clear.

Further Reading:

• David Hytner, "Premier League preview No1: Arsenal"
• Dominic Fifield, "Olivier Giroud could make a striking difference for Arsenal"
• Raphael Honigstein: "A more mature Podolski set to prosper in Premier League"
• Sid Lowe: "Cazorla lifts Malaga's prospects"