Goalkeeper distribution trends limited in their ability to predict successful tactics in MLS

At the end of May, Peter Brownell wrote a blog post for Opta Sports that looked at data on the percentages MLS goalkeepers played the ball long versus short in the 2011 MLS season. The table above is from Brownell's original posting and shows goalkeeper distribution trends from that season for each MLS team. While his data set is interesting, Brownell uses it to arrive at some suspect suggestions about what are the most successful tactics for MLS teams to employ.


He starts off the article noting that American soccer is known for the speed and athleticism of its players over their technical merits on the ball. I'd agree with this point. He uses this bit of information to hypothesize that goalkeepers in MLS will more often than not select to hit long fifty-fifty balls rather than going short and forcing a team to advance the ball with patient buildup from the back.

Indeed, his data backs that hypothesis. MLS goalkeepers elected to play the ball long 58% of the time. Only three teams played the ball short more than long- Chivas USA, Toronto FC, and the New York Red Bulls. He points out that these three teams all had relatively disappointing seasons. Chivas USA and Toronto FC finished in 8th place out of 9 teams in their respective divisions and the New York Red Bulls squeaked into the playoffs in 5th place and were disposed of quickly by the LA Galaxy. Brownell unconvincingly uses these three teams' lack of success to suggest that the best tactics for MLS teams may be to forgo the defense altogether and launch long balls from the goalkeeper. He says,

This suggests, perhaps, that playing out of the back in MLS 2011 might not have been the most fruitful strategy.  One theory to explain this is the idea that MLS players are not technical enough to competently build long, calculated passing sequences.  This is not a slight at the technique of MLS players, but rather trumpets the physically superior MLS rosters.  MLS players are athletes who are fast and fit, bring intense pressure, and close down backs quickly.  As a result, teams like Toronto FC and Red Bull New York turn the ball over in their defensive thirds and give up cheap goals (watch Tim Ream's gaffes against the Philadelphia Union and Real Salt Lake for proof).

By implementing a 4-3-3 and trying to play the beautiful game beautifully, Aaron Winter (Toronto FC's manager) is fighting a losing battle.  The numbers say so at least.  It is easier, safer, and more reliable to forget the backline, smash the ball forward and attempt to win the territorial battle.  Getting big-bodied strikers and midfielders into the box and battling for set-pieces is regarded as ugly soccer, but it can bear results.

Brownell fails however to mention the relative lack of success in the league of teams at the other end of his table, those that elected to play long from the keeper the highest percentage of times. Of the five teams that played the ball long from the keeper the most, only Columbus made the playoffs and they were beaten in the opening round. His suggestion that patient buildup from the back may not be the most fruitful strategy for MLS teams would be much better supported by possession data. While the percentage of balls played long from the keeper may be indicative of the importance a team places on keeping possession, I don't think that stat in and of itself is very telling in explaining a team's success. After all, how many goals begin with moves that start from the goalkeeper? I'd guess that the vast majority of the time goals come from intercepting the ball from the opposition, not from a team's own keeper.

I do think Brownell's data could be put to good use since I believe how often a team plays long from the goalkeeper is a good indicator of how much importance they place on winning the possession battle. It would be interesting to see how Brownell's data correlated to average possession data in MLS and then how average possession data correlated to league success. This information would be more telling of whether direct or possession-style tactics created more successful teams.

Is Clint Dempsey undervalued in the transfer market?

The often unreliable Daily Mirror reported earlier this week that Clint Dempsey is on the verge of a move to Liverpool for a £7.5m fee. A common response to this transfer rumor has been that £7.5m seems like a very low fee for a player of Dempsey’s quality. Dempsey was the joint-4th leading scorer in the 2011-12 Premier League with 17 league goals. Perhaps even more impressive, Dempsey was involved, by either scoring or assisting, in 54 percent of Fulham’s non-own goals in the 2011-12 Premier League—that is the highest share of involvement in a club’s non-own goals in the Premier League's 2011-12 season.¹ Moreover, Dempsey’s 23 goals for Fulham in all competitions during the 2011-12 season was hardly a fluke. During the 2010-11 season, Dempsey scored a very respectable 14 goals in all competitions, 12 of which were Premier League goals. 

While it’s clear that Dempsey is a very talented player, actually calculating a player’s value in the transfer market is a convoluted exercise. Two primary factors are driving down his cost in the transfer market: his age (29.3 years) and the one year remaining on his contract. Prior to the implementation of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules,² wealthy clubs like Chelsea and Manchester City were much less concerned about a player’s value in 3-5 years. But, as the rules are implemented, these clubs are now forced to consider a longer time horizon for player purchases. If Chelsea buy a player who is age 21 for £35-40m, in 4 years that player is still in the prime of his career. Consequently, Chelsea could sell the player and likely collect a substantial fee or avoid paying a hefty transfer fee for a replacement. On the other hand, if Chelsea buy a player who is age 29 for £35-40m, in 4 years it is unlikely that the player will still be able to play at high level. Chelsea probably could get at most £2-3m for a player who is 33, and they would need to spend even more cash for a replacement. While this example is presented as a hypothetical, Chelsea spent £35m on 21-year-old Eden Hazard earlier this summer. During the summer of 2006, Chelsea bought then 29-year-old Andriy Shevchenko from AC Milan for £40m. Shevchenko had a terribly disappointing spell with the club. He returned to Milan on loan for the 2008-09 season and then left Chelsea for Dynamo Kiev on a free transfer during the summer of 2009.

Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski summarize the basic economics behind buying and selling older players in their book Soccernomics (57-58):

Second, older players are overrated. "I've noticed over the years how often Liverpool sell players as they near or pass their thirtieth birthday," notes Taylor in his book. "Bob Paisley [Liverpool's then manager] believes the average First Division footballer is beginning to burn out at thirty."  Taylor added, rather snottily, that that was true of "running side like Liverpool," but less so of a passing one like Forest. Nonetheless, he agreed with the principle of selling older players.

The master of that trade today is Wenger. Arsenal's manager is one of the few people in soccer who can view the game from the outside. In part, this is because he has a degree in economic sciences from the University of Strasbourg in France. As a trained economist, he is inclined to trust data rather than the game's received wisdom. Wenger sees that in the transfer market, clubs tend to overvalue a player's past performance. That prompts them to pay fortunes for players who have just passed their peak. Probably because Wenger was one of the first managers to use statistics to assess players, he spotted that older players declined sooner than was conventionally realized. […]

Wenger often lets defenders carry on until their midthirties, but he usually gets rid of his midfielders and forwards much younger. He sold Patrick Vieira for $25 million (age twenty-nine), Thierry Henry for $30 million (age twenty-nine), Emmanuel Petit for $10.5 million (age twenty-nine), and Marc Overmars for $37 million (age twenty-seven), and none of them ever did as well again after leaving Arsenal.

The Taylor that Kuper and Szymanski reference above is Peter Taylor who, along with Brian Clough, assembled the Nottingham Forest teams in the 1970s that won two European Cups on a very limited budget.

A simple method to gauge Dempsey’s value in the transfer market is to compare Dempsey to “similar” purchases. To do this, I searched through the current rosters of Manchester City, Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Tottenham, and Liverpool. From the current rosters for only these clubs, I compiled a list of the players whose clubs purchased them on or after their 28th birthday:

Of the 13 players who satisfy the above criteria, four players were free transfers, five players cost less than £10m, three players cost £10-12m, and one player cost £16m. Interestingly, Manchester United’s roster does not contain a single player who was purchased by the club on or after his 28th birthday. The two largest fees, those of Kolo Toure and Gareth Barry, were purchases of Manchester City during the summer of 2009 prior to the start of FFP implementation. Meireles, Arteta, and Benayoun seem like more comparable purchases, but I believe all three had longer than one year remaining on their contracts at the date of their transfer. When players have a single year remaining on their contract, their transfer fee is obviously deflated since the purchasing club could have the player on a free the following summer. How much is having Dempsey for the 2012-13 season worth? This question is somewhat misleading since a purchasing club would also risk losing Dempsey to another club the following summer. Arsenal reportedly offered €7m for Marouane Chamakh in the summer of 2009, and Bordeaux turned down the offer. Chamakh subsequently signed with Arsenal on a free transfer in the summer of 2010.

My personal view is that a player of Dempsey’s quality with a proven track record in the Premier League is likely worth more than £7.5m even at 29.3 years of age with one year on his contract. That said, I think there is little evidence to suggest that he is severely undervalued. He is probably worth in the range of £1-3m more than the rumored £7.5m price tag, but his price very well could increase before any deal is done. If he had more than one year remaining on his contract, I'd probably add another £1-2m to the fee.

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1. Dempsey’s 54 percent edged out Robin van Persie in this category who was involved with 53 percent of Arsenal’s 2011-12 Premier League goals.
2. While UEFA will not assess a club’s finances until the 2013-14 season, they will analyze a club’s finances for that season and the two prior seasons (2011-12 and 2012-13).